Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v1.djvu/375

Rh seem to be forgotten. For this, the Journals of Congress were appealed to. It was from them shown, that, when the committee of Congress reported to that body the Articles of Confederation, the very first article which be came the subject of discussion was that respecting equality of suffrage—that Virginia proposed divers modes of suffrage, all on the principle of inequality, which were almost unanimously rejected—that, on the question for adopting the article, it passed, Virginia being the only state which voted in the negative—that, after the Articles of Confederation were submitted to the states, by them to be ratified, almost every state proposed certain amendments, which they instructed their delegates to endeavor to obtain before ratification; and that, among all the amendments proposed, not one state, not even Virginia, proposed an amendment of that article securing the equality of suffrage; the most convincing proof it was agreed to, and adopted, not from necessity, but upon a full conviction that, according to the principles of free government, the states had a right to that equality of suffrage.

But, sir, it was to no purpose that the futility of their objections was shown. When driven from the pretence that the equality of suffrage had been originally agreed to on principles of expediency and necessity, the representatives of the large states persisted in a declaration, that they would never agree to admit the smaller states to an equality of suffrage. In answer to this, they were informed, and informed in terms the most strong and energetic that could possibly be used, that we never would agree to a system giving them the undue influence and superiority they proposed—that we would risk every possible consequence—that from anarchy and confusion order might arise—that slavery was the worst that could ensue, and we considered the system proposed to be the most complete, most abject system of slavery that the wit of man ever devised, under the pretence of forming a government for free states—that we never would submit tamely and servilely to a present certain evil in dread of a future, which might be imaginary—that we were sensible the eyes of our country and the world were upon us—that we would not labor under the imputation of being unwilling to form a strong and energetic federal government; but we would publish the system which we approved, and also that which we opposed, and leave it to our country and the world at large to judge, between us, who best understood the rights of freemen and free states, and who best advocated them; and to the same tribunal we would submit, who ought to be answerable for all the consequences which might arise to the Union, from the Convention breaking up without proposing any system to their constituents. During this debate, we were threatened that, if we did not agree to the system proposed, we never should have an opportunity of meeting in convention to deliberate on another: and this was frequently urged. In answer, we called upon them to show what was to prevent it, and from what quarter was our danger to proceed. Was it from a foreign enemy? Our distance from Europe, and the political situation of that country, left us but little to fear. Was there any ambitious state or states, who, in violation of every sacred obligation, was preparing to enslave the other states, and raise itself to consequence on the ruin of the others? Or was there any such ambitious individual? We did not apprehend it to be the case. But suppose it to be true; it rendered it the more necessary that we should sacredly guard against a system which might enable all those ambitious views to be carried into effect, even under the sanction of the Constitution and government. In fine, sir, all