Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v1.djvu/373

Rh under a state government—that every argument which shows one man ought not to have more votes than another, because he is wiser, stronger, or wealthier, proves that one state ought not to have more votes than another, because it is stronger, richer, or more populous; and that, by giving one state, or one or two states, more votes than the others, the others thereby are enslaved to such state or states, having the greater number of votes, in the same manner as in the case before put of individuals, when one has more votes than the others—that the reason why each individual man, in forming a state government, should have an equal vote, is, because each individual, before he enters into government, is equally free and independent; so each state, when states enter into a federal government, are entitled to an equal vote, because before they entered into such federal government, each state was equally free and equally independent—that adequate representation of men, formed into a state government, consists in each man having an equal voice; either personally, or if by representatives, that he should have an equal voice in choosing the representatives—so adequate representation of states in a federal government consists in each state having an equal voice, either in person or by its representative, in every thing which relates to the federal government—that this adequacy of representation is more important in a federal, than in a state government, because the members of a state government, the district of which is not very large, have generally such a common interest, that laws can scarcely be made by one part oppressive to the others, without their suffering in common; but the different states composing an extensive federal empire, widely distant one from the other, may have interests so totally distinct, that the one part might be greatly benefited by what would be destructive to the other.

They were not satisfied by resting it on principles; they also appealed to history. They showed that, in the Amphictyonic confederation of the Grecian cities, each city, however different in wealth, strength, and other circumstances, sent the same number of deputies, and had each an equal voice in every thing that related to the common concerns of Greece. It was shown that, in the seven provinces of the United Netherlands, and the confederated cantons of Switzerland, each canton, and each province, have an equal vote, although there are as great distinctions of wealth, strength, population, and extent of territory, among those provinces, and those cantons, as among these states. It was said that the maxim, that taxation and representation ought to go together, was true so far that no person ought to be taxed who is not represented; but not in the extent insisted upon, to wit, that the quantum of taxation and representation ought to be the same; on the contrary, the quantum of representation depends upon the quantum of freedom, and therefore all, whether individual states or individual men, who are equally free, have a right to equal representation—that to those who insist that he who pays the greatest share of taxes ought to have the greatest number of votes, it is a sufficient answer to say, that this rule would be destructive of the liberty of the others, and would render them slaves to the more rich and wealthy—that, if one man pays more taxes than another, it is because he has more wealth to be protected by government, and he receives greater benefits from the government; so, if one state pays more to the federal government, it is because, as a state, she enjoys greater blessings from it; she has more wealth protected by it, or a greater number of inhabitants, whose rights are secured, and who share its advantages. 45