Page:Dawn of the Day.pdf/175

Rh towards rationality; for we judge more objectively the value and significance of an occurrence, which happens to others and not to ourselves ; the value, for instance, of a case of death, some money-loss, slander. Pity as the principle of acting, on the other hand, with its precept—Suffer by another's misfortune, as he himself suffers—would force the ego-point of view with its exaggeration and eccentricity to become the point of view of the other, that is, of the sympathiser as well ; so that we should have to suffer both from our own and the other's ego, and should thus voluntarily burden ourselves with a double irrationality instead of making the burden of our own as light as possible. —Whenever we find out that a person whom we love, honour, and admire suffers, which invariably fills us with extreme astonishment, because we cannot but imagine that our happiness, as derived from him, must flow from a superabundant source of personal happiness—our sensations of love, reverence and admiration become essentially modified : they become more tender, that is: the gulf between him and ourselves seems to be bridged over, and an approach to equality to take place. Only then it seems possible that we may requite him the good done to us, whereas, previously, he lived in our imagination as one superior to our gratitude. This capability of requiting