Page:Daniel Schrock v. Learning Curve International, Inc. 7th Cir. 08-1296.djvu/15

 Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945)). The court explained that for derivative works, as for any other work, “[t[he test of originality is concededly one with a low threshold in that all that is needed is that the author contributed something  more than a merely trivial variation, something recognizably his own.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).

The concern expressed in Gracen was that a derivative work could be so similar in appearance to the underlying work that  in a subsequent infringement suit brought by a derivative author, it would be difficult  to separate  the original elements of expression in the derivative and underlying works in order to determine  whether one derivative work infringed another. The opinion offered the example of artists A and B who both painted their versions of the Mona Lisa, a painting in the public domain. See Gracen, 698 F.2d at 304. “[I]f the difference between the original and A’s reproduction is  slight, the difference between A’s and B’s reproductions will also be slight, so that if B had  access to A’s  reproductions the trier of fact will be hard-pressed to decide whether B was copying A or copying the Mona Lisa itself.” Id.

No doubt this concern is  valid. But nothing in the Copyright Act suggests that derivative works are subject to a more exacting originality requirement than other works of authorship. Indeed, we have explained since Gracen that “the only ‘originality’ required for [a] new work to by [sic] copyrightable. . . is enough expressive variation from public-domain or other existing works to enable the new work to be readily distinguished from its