Page:Dakota Territory Reports.djvu/84

 Another rule of construction always acknowledged and acted upon, is that in determining the meaning of a law or the intention of a law maker, the evil sought to be remedied should be considered.

Congress has been enacting statutes now for nearly a century. It would, therefore, be impossible to retain in mind all the repealed acts which the repeal of the repealing acts might revive. It was, therefore, perhaps wise to establish the rule that no repealed act should be revived except by express words. However this might have been for Congress, the reason has no force within the Territory where the statutes are limited to a few years and could easily be called to mind.

But the controlling reason upon this question lies in the fact, that by the Organic Act, section 6, it is provided: That "the legislative power of this Territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this act."

This act gives to the legislature complete control of the question of legislation subject to the limitation therein named. In reference to the manner in which laws shall be enacted, or in which they shall be repealed, whether it shall be by direct words, or by implication, or repugnancy, no rule is laid down. And can it be contended, that some ten years after the Organic Act was passed, after the legislature had always acted without limit under it, that a rule expressly made for Congress itself, operates to modify or limit that Organic Act? and, therefore, laws must be passed and repealed, or revived in the Territory, just as they are passed, revived, or repealed by Congress?

Let us reverse this proposition; In the act referred to, Congress provides how it will enact laws, what captions, titles, etc., it will have, and how it will repeal them. Would it be contended for a moment, that if a Territorial law, duly passed, did not have the same form of heading or caption that a law of Congress has, it would be void? and, yet, this reasoning is as forcible as to the form of enacting clauses as it is to the form of repeal.