Page:Cyclopaedia, Chambers - Volume 2.djvu/968

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that their Books lie all together without any Difllnflion of Points and Virgula's. See Pointus.

VIRGULTUM, in our antient Law-books, is ufed for an Holt, or Plantation of Twigs, or Ozicrs.

Sometimes alio for a Coppice of young Wood : El fr£- terea concerto Virgultum meum ef totam communiam Domi- nii mei. Mop. Angl.

In another place of the fame Work, it may be taken for Virgata, viz.— Tlcdit fneiiBie Ecclefia mam Vttgultam TcrrcS in Manerio de Cumftone.

VIRIDARIO cligendo, a Writ that lies for the Choice of a Verderor in the Foreft. See Verberor.

VIRIDE-Sm, thefameas^Ensgs, ot Verdegreafe. See

VeRDEGREASE.

VIRILE, fomething that belongs or is peculiar to Man.

Thus Virile Member, Membrum Virile, is frequently ufed for the Penis. See Penis.

The Virile Age, Mtas Virilis, is the Strength and Vigour of a Man's Age, via. from thirty to forty-five Years, which is an Age wherein we are equally remov'd from the Ex- tremes of Youth and old Age. See Age.

The Civil Lawyers only make one Age of Youth and Vi- rility ; and yet their different Temperatures feem to require a Diflinflion ; for which Reafon fome compare Youth to Summer, and Virility to Autumn. See Puberty.

At Rome, the Youth quitted the Pnetexta at fourteen or fifteen Years of Age, and took the Virile Gown, Toga vi- rilis, to (hew, it feems, that they then entred on a ferious Age. See Prjetexta and Toga.

M. Tlacier will have it, the Children did not take the P>r<etexta till thirteen Years of Age, nor quit it for the Toga Virilis, till feventeen.

VIRILIA, a Man's privy Members, including the Tenis and Teftes. See Penis, pc.

The cutting off the Virilia, according to BraEion, was Fe- lony by Common Law, and that whether the Party were confenting or not. See Eunuch.

— Henricns Hall & A. Uxor ejus cafti S$ detenti in prifona de Evilchejler, eo quod rcSati fuerunt quod ipji aifciderunt Virilia Johannis Monacbi, quern idem Henricns deprebendit cum pruBus, or 2>u3us Virtfimgii, in Ana- tomy, a Canal, more ufually call'd, TluSus Tancreaticus. See Pancreaticus. It took its Name, Vertfungianus, from the Inventor, Vertfung.

VIRTUAL, Potential, fomething that has a Power or Vertue of acting or doing. See Virtually.

The Term is chiefly underflood of fomething that acts by a fecret invifible Caufe ; in Opposition to aflual, and fenfible. See Potential.

Virtual F-CUS, in Opticks, is a Point from which Rays, before converging, begin to diverge, or divaricate. See Focus.

Hence it is alfo call'd, SPote of Difperflon, ox 'Divergence; in Opposition to the Focus, which is call'd thePoint of Con- currence. See Point, Dispersion, Divergent, iSc.

Suppofe, e.g. the Concavity of a Glafs to be a b c (Tab. OpticksV'\g. it.) and its Axis d e ; let fg be a Ray of Light falling on the Glafs parallel to the Axis de, and let d be the Centre of the Ark a b c.

This Ray / g, after it has paffed the Glafs, at its Emer- fion at g, will not proceed directly to b, but be refrafled from the Perpendicular d g, and become the Ray g k.

Draw then direflly g k, fo that it may crofs the Axis in f.— The Point e fo found, Mr. Molyneux calls the Virtual Focus, or 'Point of Divergence. Diopt. Nov.

VIRTUALITY, Virtualitas, in the Schools, is fome Mode or Analogy in a Object, which in reality is the fame with fome other Mode ; but out of regard to contradiflory Predicates, is look'd on as if really dtitinct therefrom.

Thus the divine Nature, and the Perfon of the Word are two Virtualities ; for tho in reality they be the fame yet are they confider'd as things different. — For the Perfon of the Word is faid to have been begotten, and his Nature is faid not to be begotten : now begotten, and not-begotten, are contradictory Predicates.

And hence arife what we call virtual Diftintlions, where- by one Virtually is diflinguifh'd from another, not one Thing from another.

Thus it is the divine Nature is diflinguifh'd from the di- vine Perfon, and the divine Underflanding from the divine Will.. See Trinity.

VIRTUALLY, Vjrtualiter, in theSchoolj, is applied to a Mode of Exiftence. — Thus a thing is faid to be Virtually any where, when it is deem'd to be there by fome Virtue, Influence, or other Effect produe'd by it.

As the Sun is Virtually on Earth, i. e. by his Liaht, Heat, Ste.

A thing is alfo faid to be Virtually prefent when the Vir- tues or Properties belonging to it, and iffuing from it, re-

i ) vir

main.— —In which Senfe the Forms of the Elements are held to be Virtually in mix'd Bod.es.

A thing is alfo faid to be a Caufe Virtually, or a Virtual ff 'f e '^ nd that ,wo Wa ? s : the firft. w hen there is no real Uiitinition between ir, and the Effea attributed to it ; and yet it is conceived by us as if it were really the Caufe there- ot: * -Thus, Immutability in God, is the Caufe of Eternity.

Secondly, when an Effect is not of the fame kind with the Caule, and yet the Caufe has the ■Power, or Virtue of pro- ducing the Effect : thus the Sun is not formally, but Virtu- ally 'hot; and Fire is not contain'd formally ', 'but Virtually

VIRTUE, Virtus, a Term ufed in various fignifications.

In the General, it denotes 'Power, or Perfection of any Thing, whether Natural or Super-natural, Animate or In- animate, Effential or Acceffary : hence the Virtues of God, Angels, Men, Plants, Elements, tSc. See Power, and Faculty.

In its more proper and reftrain'd Senfe, Virtue fignifies a Habit, which improves and perfects the Haver or Pof- feffor, and his Aflions. See Habit, Perfection, iSc.

In this Senfe, Virtue is a Principle of acting, or doing well and readily; and that, eithet infufed from above, fuch as are the Theological Virtues ; or acquired by our own Ap- plication, as the IntelleSual and Moral Virtues.

For, as there are two Things in Man from which all his Aflions proceed, viz. the Underflanding, and the Will ; fo the Virtue by which he is perfefled, or whereby he is dif- pofed to do all Things rightly, and to live happily, mult be two-fold : the one; of the Underftar.dino ; the other, of the Will.

That which improves the Underflanding is call'd Intellec- tual or Ttianoetic ; and that, the Will, Moral or Ethic.

For, fince there are two Things requir'd in order to live a-right, viz. to know what mould be done ; and, when known, teadily to perform it : And fince Man is apt to err various Ways in each refpefl, unlcfs regulated by Difcipline, iSc. he alone can deport himfelf rightly in his whole Courfe of Life, whofe Underflanding and Will have attain'd their utmoft Perfection.

An Intellectual Virtue, then, according to Ariftotle, is a Habit of the reafonable Soul, whereby it conceives, orfpeaks the Truth ; either in affirming, or denying. See Truth.

The Virtues which come under this Clafs, are divided into Speculative ; which are thofe converfant about neceffary Things, that can only be known, or contemplated ; and Practical, which are converfant about contingent Things, that may likewife be praflifed.

Ariftotle has another Diviiion of Intellectual Virtue, fetch'd Join the Subjefl ; as fome of 'em are featcd in the Zfawpwim, or Contemplative Part, viz. thofe converfantabout neceffary things, as Science, Wifdom, Intelligence. See Sci- ence, Understanding, tSc.

And others, in the Acyisnm, or Pra&ioal Part ; fuch as thofe converfant about contingent Things, as 'Prudence, Art, iic. See Art, e?c.

Moral Virtue is defined by Ariftotle to be an eleflive Habit, placed in a Mediocrity, determin'd by Reafon, and as a prudent Man would determine.

The Scotifts maintain every moral Habit to be indifferent as to good or evil, and capable of becoming, fucceflively, either Virtue or Vice : Virtue, if it have a relation of con- formity with right Reafon ; and Vice, if it have not. See Vice.

According to them, therefore, Virtue is a Habit fubjec- tively, but not entitatively, good: as it is only a re- lation of Conformity, Sfc. which is feparable from the En- tity of the Habit.

The Thomifts, on the contrary, affert Virtue to be a Ha- bit effentiaily good ; nor capable of miniftring any thing to any Act positively bad. — And rhey philofophize thus : Every Habit effentiaily good, inclines to Acts like thofe whereby it was acquired ; thus, by doing juftly we become juft ; and, by abstaining from forbidden Pleafures, we become tem r perate. But Moral Virtue is produced, or acquired by Afls effentiaily good ; good, we mean, both in telpcfl of our Duty, and of the Motive and End : therefore Moral Vir- tue inclines only to good Afls.

Others difallow the Peripatetic Notion of 'Virtue as placed in a Habit ; for a Habit, or Hability, fay they, includes two Things; a Cuftom, and Facility; the firft as a Caufe, and the fecond as an Effefl : fo that a Habit is nothing but a Facility acquired by Cuftom.— They therefore who make Virtue a Habit of doing well, mill of ne'ceffity afcribe it to a frequent Exercifeof good Aflions. — But this can't be ; for the Virtue muft be before the good Aflions ; and the Habit, after 'em. — Indeed, whence fhou'd the Aflions proceed but from Virtue > Virtue thetefore is before the good Aflions, and certainly before a Habit refulting from a frequency of good Aflions.

Hence