Page:Cyclopaedia, Chambers - Volume 2.djvu/710

 SEN [55]

the K'ght, could fee, for fome Time, to read a moderate hint. In the ?«#, franf. N». 3, 2 . we have an Recount ot .ttoz. Frttfir, who continued Deaf and Dumb from his Birth to the i 7 thYear of his Age ; when upon recovering from a Fever, he perceived an unca ■" "

SEN

folded on W an d n &**l ^ ™"< <* **•** »
 * „"";„ !"„r^°?,, : n ! 0n ° f f 2 me Perfeftion, or Defici-

—i uncafy Motion ,„ his Brain, after which he began to hear, and, by de- grees, to ipeak. Grimaldi affirms, That ibme Women of jtftgara were able, by their Eyes alone, to diftinguilli be- tween Eggs lay'd by black Hens, and thole by white ones, Grimald. de Lum. ££? Col.

Senses. A late excellent Author, gives us a more Tuft Extcnfive, and Philofophical Notion of Seilfe On his' principle, Senfe is defined, A Timer of 'Perception ; or A •Power of receiving Ideas ; If what is abfolutely Paffive may be properly called a Power. On fome Occafions instead of 'Power, he chufes to call it, A determination of the Mind, to receive Ideas. See I DEA. The Ideas thus perceived, or railed in the Mind, he calls Seifa- titus.

Sense, he confiders, cither as Natural, or Moral : and the Natural, either as External, or Internal ; though the Diftnbimon is chiefly founded on the common Ways of conceiving ; for, in Reality, they appear to be all Natural, and neceflary : Some Reaions, however, for the Diftinfli- on, will be ftiewn under the feveral Articles thereof.

External Senses, are Powers of perceiving Ideas, upon the Pretence of external Objefts. Oil fuch Occafions, we find the Mind is merely Paffive, and has not Power dircaly to prevent the Perception, or Idea, or to vary it at its Reception ; as long as the Body is continued in a State fit to be acted upon by the external Object. When two Perceptions are entirely different from each other, or agree in nothing but the general Idea of Senla- tion ; the Power of receiving thofe different Perceptions, are called different Sevfes. Thus Seeing and Hearing de- note the different Powers of receiving the Ideas of Co- lours, and Sounds. And though Colours, as well as Sounds, have vail Differences amongft themfelves ; yet is there a greater Agreement among the moft oppofite Colours, than betwen any Colour and a Sound : And hence all Colours are deemed Perceptions of the fame Senfe. All the feveral Senfes feem to have their diStinft Organs, except Peeling, which is, in lbme Degree, diffu- sed over the whole Body.

Internal Senses, are Powers, or Determinations of the Mind, to be pleated with certain Forms, and Ideas, which occur to our Observation, in Objects perceived by the external Senfes. Of thefe there are two different Species, dittinguifh'd by the different Objefls of Plea- fure, via. Fleafiirable or Beautiful Forms of natural Things, and- Pleaiurable or Beautiful Actions, or Cha- racters ofTational Agents : Whence the Internal Senfes become divifible into Natural and Moral ; though what we call the Internal Natural Senfe, our Author calls fimply, and by way of Eminence, the Internal Senfe.

Ill reflecting on our external Safes, we plainly fee, that our Perceptions of Plealiire, or Pain, do not depend directly on our Will. Objects do not pleafe us according as we incline they fhould : The Pretence of ibme Ob- jects necefl'arily pleafe us, and rhe Prefence of others as neceffarily diipleafes us ; nor can we, by our Will, any ofherwife procure Pleafure, or avoid Pain, than by pro- curing the former Kind of Objects, and avoiding the _lattcr. By the very Frame of our Nature, the one is nude the Occafion of Delight, and the other of Diffa- tisfaction. In Effect, our Sensitive Perceptions are plea- fant, and painful, immediately, and without any Know- ledge of the Caulb of this Pleafure and Pain, or of the Manner how they excite if, or are Occafions of it, or without teeing to what further Advantage, or Detriment, the Ufe of liich Objects might tend. Nor would the molt accurate Knowledge of thefe Things vary either the Pleafure, or the Iain, of the Perception ; however it might give a rational Pleafure diltinct from the fen- fible ; or might raifc a dillinc! Joy, from Profpect of fur- ther Advantage in the Object, or Averfion, from Ap- prehension of Evil. There is fcarce any Object, which our Minds are employed abour, but is conflituted the ne- ceiTary Occafion of fome Pleafure or Pain. Thus we fhall I find our felves pleated with a regular Form, a Piece of Architecture, or Painting, a Composition of Notes, a theorem, an Action, an Affection, a Character ; and we 2'e confeious that this Pleafure naturally arifes from the Contemplation of the Idea then preftnt to the Mind, whh all its Circumftances, though fome of thofe Ideas " av e nothing of what we call Sensible Perception in them ;, And in thole which have, the Pleafure arifes from fome Uniformity, Order, Arrangement, Imitation, and not ♦ram the fimple Ideas of Colour, or Sound, or Mode of ■txtenfion Separately confider'd.

V fems hence to follow, that when Instruction, Edu- cation, or Prejudice, of any Kind, raiie any Defire or

ency, in thofe Qualities, for Percent,-. i ' ? the- proper Se,$. Thus, if £v h^"r /h who P bas not tie Senfe rfl^he j^t^ te raited by fome apprehended Re|ula'rity of Figure7sweet! nets of Voice Smoothnefs, Softnefs, or fcmf other Qua-

tt FdTarrCot^ "" *f» .* *** ">*» »

f,l he, ° nly r F i ea&re f S ¥ e ' which ° ur Philosophers teem to confider, ,s that which accompanies the fiLle Ideas of Senjanon; but there are vaftly greater Plea fures in thofe complex Ideas of Objects, which obtain he Names of Beautiful and HarmLious. The Power" then, whereby we receive Ideas of Beauty, and Har! mony has all the Characters of a Senfe. 'Tis no Matter, whether we call thefe Ideas of Beauty, and Harmony Perceptions of the external Senfes of Seeing, and Hearing or not; we Should rather chufe to call thefe Ideas an Wsrwljeafe, were it only for the Convenience of di- ftinguifhing them from other Sulfations of Seeing and Hearing, which Men may have without Perception of Beauty and Harmony. See Pleasure, Beauty, and Harmony. 7 '

Moral Sense, is a Determination of the Mind, to be pleas d with the Contemplation of thofe Affections, Afli- ons, or Charaflers of rational Agents, which we call Virtuous.

This Moral Senfe of Beauty, in Actions, and Affefli- ons, may appear Strange at firSt View : Some of our Mo- rales themselves are offended at it in my Lord Shafts- bury, as being accuftomed to deduce every Approbation, or Averfion, from rational Views of Interest. Our Gen- tlemen of good Tafle can tell us of a great many Senfes, TaSles, andfolifb.es, for Beauty, Harmony, Imitation in Painting and Poetry; and may we not find, too, in Man- kind, a Relifh for a Beauty in Characters, in Manners ? ihe truth is, Human Nature does not feem to have been left quite indifferent in the Affairs of Virtue to form to it felt Obietvations concerning the Advantage or Diiadvantage of Actions, and accordingly to regulate its Condua The Weaknefs of our Reafon, and the Avo- cations arifing from the Infirmity and Neceilitics of our Nature, are fo great, that very few of Mankind could have found thofe long Deduflions of Reafon, which may fliew tome Actions to be, in the whole, advantageous, and their Contraries pernicious. The Author of Nature has much better furnifhed us for a Virtuous Conduct than our Morahfts feem to imagine • by almoft as quick and powerful Inttruflions, as we have for the Preserva- tion of our Bodies: He has made Virtue a lovely Form, to excite our Purfuit of ir, and has given us Strong Affections, to be the Springs of each virtuous Action. See Virtue.

SENSIBLE Horizon-)

Sensible Point

$

See

, CHorizc

'^t-PoiNT.

SENSITIVE or SENSIBLE Soul, the Soul of Brutes, or rhat which Man is fuppofed to have in common with Brutes. See Sour,. 'Tis thus call'd, as intimating its utmoft Faculty, to be that of Senfation ; or, perhaps, becaufe it is fuppofed to be material, and to come under our Senfes. My Lord Bacon afferts, That the Senfible or Brute Soul, is plainly no more rhan a Corporeal Substance attenuated by Heat, and thus render d Invifible ; or a kind ot Aura or Vapour partly of an aerial, and partly a fiery Nature; endued with the Softnefs of Air, to befit to re- ceive Impreffions, and with the Vigor of Fire, to com- municate its Aflion ; fed partly with oily Matters, and partly with aqueous ones ; inclofed in the Body, and in the more perfect Animals ; principally in the Head, moving along the Nerves ; and reflored and repaired by the Spi- rituous Blood of the Atteries. Sac. de Augment. Scient. Lib. IV.

Sensitive-Plants, a Species of Plants, call'd by the Ancients JEfckynomenous, and by us Senfltive, Living or Mimic Plants, as giving fome Tokens of Senfe. Thefe are luch whole Frame and Constitution is fo nice and tender, that at the Touch, or lead Preffure of one's Hand, they will contract rheir Leaves and Flowers, as if fenflUe of the Contact. Botanick Writers mention many Kinds hereof ; fome of which contract with the Hand or a Stick ; others with Heat, others with Cold. The Truth is, ma- ny, if not moft, Vegetables expand their Flowers, Down, fife, in warm, Sun-fhiny Weather, and again clofe them towards Evening or in Rain, X$c. efpecially at the be- ginning of Flowering, whilft the Seed is yet young and tender : As is very evident in the Down of 'Dandelion, l$c. and in the Flower of the Pimpernel, the opening and fhutting whereof are the Country-man's Weather-wifer ; whereby, Gerard fays, he foretells what Weather fhall

follow