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or compleat Ideas, all the Agreement or Difagreement weihallfind in them, will produce real Knowledge, as well as in mathematical Figures. That which is requi- fite to make our Knowledge' certain, is the Clearnefs of our Ideas ; and that which is required to make it real, is that they anfwer their Archetypes. But it will here be laid. That if moral Knowledge be placed in the Contem- plation of our own moral Ideas, and thofe are of our own making, what ftrange Notions will there be of Juf- tice and Temperance ? What Confulion of Virtues and Vices, if every Man may make what Ideas of them he pleafes ? To which it is anfwered, No Confufion or Diforder at all in the Things themfelves, nor the Rea- fonmgs about them, no more than there would be a Change in the Properties of Figures, and their Relations one to another, if a Man Ihould make a Triangle with four Corners, or a Trapezium with four right Angles ; that is, in plain Engiijb, change the Names of the Fi- gures, and call that by one Name which is called ordi- narily by another The Change of Name will indeed at firft difturb him, who knows not what Idea it Hands for,; but as foon as the Figure is drawn, the Confequen- ces and Demonfliation are plain and clear. Juft the fame is it in moral Knowledge : Let a Man have the Idea of taking from others, without their Confcnt, what they are juftly poffeffed of, and call this Jutticeif he plcafeth ; he that takes the Name there, without the Idea put to it, will be miftaken, by joining another Idea of his own to that Name ; but llrip the Idea of that Name, or take it, fuch as it is, in the Speaker's Mind, and the fame things will agree to it, as if you called it Injuflice. One thing we are to take notice of, That where God, or any other Law-maker, has defined any moral Names, there they have made the Effence of that Species to which that Name belongs ; and there it is not fafe to apply or ufe them otherwife ; but in other Cafes it is bare Impropriety of Speech to apply them contrary to the common Ufage of the Country they are ufed in. (3.) But the complex Ideas, which we refer to Arche- types without us, may differ from them, and fo our Knowledge about them may come ftiort of being real ; and fuch are our Ideas of Subftances. Thefe limit be taken from fomething, that does, or has exifted, and not be made up of Ideas arbitrarily put together, without a- ny real Pattern. Herein therefore is founded the Re- ality of olir Knowledge concerning Subftances, that all our complex Ideas of them muftbe fuch, and fuch only, as are made up of fuch fimple ones, as have been difcovered toco-exiftin Nature: And our Ideas being thus true, tho' not perhaps very exact Copies, are the Subjefls of real Knowledge of them. Whatever Ideas we have, the Agreement we find they have with others, will be Know- ledge. If thofe Ideas be abftraa, it will be General Knowledge ; but to make it real concerning Subftances, the Ideas mull be taken from the real Exiftence of Things. Where-ever therefore we perceive the Agree- ment or Difagreement of our Ideas, there is certain Knowledge ; and where-ever we are fure thofe Ideas a- gree with the Reality of Things, there is certain real Knowledge.

As to the Improvement of our Knowledge, it being the received Opinion amongft Men of Letters, that Maxims a re the Foundation of all Knowledge, and that Sciences are each of them built upon certain Frtecognita, from whence the Understanding was to take its Rife, and by which it was to conduct itfelf in its Inquiries in the Matters be- longing to that Science ; the beaten Road of the Schools has been to lay down, in the beginning, one or more general Propofirions, called Principle!, as Foundations whereon to build the Knowledge that was to be had of that Subject. That which gave occafion to this way of Proceeding, was the good Succefs it feemed to have in Mathematicks, which, of all other Sciences, have the greateft Certainty, Cleatnefs, and Evidence in them. But if we coniider it, we /hall find that the great Ad- vancement and Certainty of real Knowledge Men arrived to in thefe Sciences, was not owing to the Influence of thefe Principles, but to the clear, diftin£r, and compleat Ideas their Thoughts were employed about ; and the Relation of Equality and Excefs fo clear between foroe of them, that they had an intuitive Knowledge, and by that a way to difcover it in others, and this without the help of thofe Maxims. For is it not poffible for a Lad to know, that his whole Body is bigger than his little Fin- ger, but by virtue of this Axiom, The whole is bigger than a Part ; nor be allured of it, till he has learned that Maxim? Let any oneconfider from what has been faid, which is known firftand eleareft by mod People, the par- ticular Inllance, or the general Rule, and which it is that gives Life and Birth to the other. Thefe general Rules arc but the comparing our more general and ab- ftraa Ideas, which Ideas are made by the Mind, and

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have Names given them, for the eafier Difpatch in ! t3 Kealonmgs : But Knowledge began in the Mind, and was, founded on Particulars, tho' afterwards perhaps no No- tice be taken thereof ; it being natural for the Mind to lay up thofe general Notions, and make the proper Ufe ot rhem, which is to disburden the Memory of the cum- berfome Load of Particulars. The way to improve in Knowledge, is not to fwallow Principles with an implicite Fajth, and without Examination, which would be apt to Bnllead Men, milead of guiding them into Truth; but to get and fix in our Minds clear and compleat Ideas, as fir as they are to be had, and annex to them proper and ranftant Names; and thus barely by confidering our Ideas, and comparing them together, obferving their A- greement or Difagreement, their Habitudes and Rela- tions, we /hall get more true and clear Knowledge by the Conduft of this one Rule, than by taking up Principles and thereby putting our Minds into the Difpofal of o- thers. We mutt therefore, if we will proceed as Reafon advifes, adapt our Methods of Inquiry to the Nature of the Ideas we examine, and the Truth we fearch after. General and certain Truths are only founded in the Ha- bitudes and Relations of abftraft Ideas ; therefore a fa- gacious methodical Application of our Thoughts foe the finding out thefe Relations, is the only way to difcover all, that can with Truth and Certainty be put into gene- ral Propofltions. By what Steps we are to proceed in thefe, is to be learned in the Schools of the Mathemati- cians, who from very plain and eafy Beginnings, by gen- tle Degrees, and a continued Chain of Reafonings, pro- ceed to the Difcovery and Demonftration of Truths, that at firft fight appear beyond human Capacity. This may reafonably be faid, that if other Ideas, that are real as well as nominal Effenccs of their Species, were purfued m the way familiar to Mathematicians, they would carry our Thoughts farther, and with greater Evidence and Clearnefs than, poffibly, we are apt to imagine. This is Reafon fufficient to advance that Conjefture above-men- tioned, viz. That Morality is capable of Demonftration as well as Mathematicks ; for moral Ideas being real Effenccs, which have a difcoverable Conneftion and A- greement one with another, fo far as we can find their Habitudes and Relations, fo far we Ihall be poffeffed of real and general Truths.

In our Knowledge of Subftances, we are to proceed af- ter a quite different Method ; the bare Contemplation of their abftraa Ideas (which are but nominal Effences) will carry us but a very little way in the Search of Truth and Certainty. Here Experience mull teach us what Reafon cannot, and it is by trying alone, that we can cer- tainly know what other Qualities co-exift with thofe of our complex Idea ; for inllance, whether that yellow heavy, fufible Body, I call Gold, be malleable or no; which Experience (however it prove in that particular Body we examine) makes us not certain that it is fo in all, or any other yellow, heavy, fufible Bodies, but that which we have tried : becaufe it is no Coniequence one way or the other from our complex Idea. TheNeccflity or Inconfiftence of Malleability hath no vifible Connec- tion with the Combination of that Colour, Weight, and Fufibility in any Body. What is here laid of the nominal Effence of Gold.fuppofed to confirtofa Body of fuch a de- terminate Colour, Weight, and Fufibility, will hold true if other Qualities be added to it. Our Reafonings from thofe Ideas will carry us but a little way in the'eertain Difcovery of the other Properties in thofe Maffes of Mat- ter wherein all thofe are to be found. As far as our Ex- perience reaches we may have certain Knowledge, and no farther. It is not denied, but that a Man, accuftomed to rational and regular Experiments, iliall be able to fee farther into the Nature of Bodies, and their unknown Properties, than one that is a Stranger to them : But this is but Judgment and Opinion, not Knowledge and Certainty. This would make it fufpefled, that Natural Philofophy is not capable of being made a Science. From Experiments and Hiflorical Observations we may draw Advantages of Eafe and Health, and thereby increafe our Stock of Conveniences for this Life ; but beyond this, it is to be feared, our Talents reach not, nor are our Faculties able to advance farther. From whence it is obvious to conclude, that fince our Faculties are not fitted to penetrate the real Eflence of Bodies, but yet plainly to difcover to us the Being of a God, and the Knowledgeoi ourfelves, enough to give us a clear Difco- very of our Duty and great Concernmenr, it will become us, as rational Creatures, to employ our Faculties about what they are moll adapted to, and follow the Direction ot Nature where it feems to point us out the way. Fcr it is rational to conclude, that our proper Employment lies in thofe Enquiries, and that fort of Knowledge which is mott fuited to our natural Capacities, and carries in it our greateft Intereft ; and therefore it is that Morality is

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