Page:Cyclopaedia, Chambers - Volume 2.djvu/66

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other, we cannot certainly know, that where any four of rent Ferfons. Secondly, Moral Ideas are commonly more

thele are, the fifth will be there alfo, how highly proba- complex than Figures; whence thefc two Inconvenien-

ble focverit may be. But the higheft Degree of Proba- ces follow, (i.) That their Names are of more uncertain

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perceived but either in particular Subjects, by theObfer- Thinking often, does not readily carry with

jie luevenr may De. rsur the nigneit Degree ot 1'rorja- ces rouuw, (i.j mat tneir JNamesare ot more uncertain

bility amounts not to Certainty, without which there can Signification : the precife Collection of fimple Ideas they

be no true Knowledge : For this Co-exiftence can be no Hand for, not being fo eafily agreed on, and fo the Sign

farther known, than it is perceived; and it cannot be that is ufed for them in Communication always, and °in

vation of our Senfes, or, in general, by the neceffary Connection of the Ideas themfelves. As to Incompatibi- lity or Repugnancy to Co-exiilcnce, we know that no Subject can have of each fort of primary Qualities, more than one Particular at once, as one Exteniion, one Figure; and fo of fenfible Ideas peculiar to each Senfe: For

-- the fame Idea, (a.) The Mind cannot eafily retain thofe precife Combinations fo exactly and perfectly, as is neceffary in the Examination of the Habitudes and Correfpondencies, Agreements or Difagreements of feveral of them one with another, efpecially where it is to be judged of by long Deductions, and the Intervention of feveral other

whatever of each kind is prefent in any Subject, excludes complex Ideas, to /hew the Agreement or Difagreement all other of that fort; for inftancc, one Subject cannot of two remote ones. One part of thefe Difadvantaaes have two Smells, or two Colours at the fame time. As in moral Ideas, which has made them be thought not to Powers of Subllances, which makes a great part of capable of Demontlration, may in a good mcafure be our Enquiries about them, and is noinconfiderablc Branch remedied by Definitions, fetting down that Collection of of our Knowledge; our Knowledge, as to thefe, reaches fimple Ideas which every Term /lull Hand for and then lhtle farther than Experience, becaufc they confift in a ufing the Term fteadily and conftantly for that precife

Collection.

As to the fourth fort of Knowledge, viz. of the real actual Exigence of Things, we have an intuitive Know- ledge of our own Exiftence, a demonllrative Knowledge of the Exigence of God, and a fenfitive Knowledge of

Texture and Motion of Parts, which we cannot by any means come to difcover; and, I doubt, whether with thofe Faculties we have, we /hall ever be able to carry our general Knowledge much farther in this Part. Expe- rience is that which in this Part we mud depend on, and it were to be wi/hed that it were more improved. We

the Objects that prefent themfelves to our Senfes. And find the Advantages fomc Mens generous Pains have this hitherto we have examined the Extent of our Knowledge, way brought to the Stock of natural Knowledge; and if in refpect of the feveral Sorts of Beings that are. There others, efpecially the Philofophers by Fire, had been fo is another Extent of it in refpect of Univerfality, which wary; in their Obfcrvarions, and fincere in their Reports, will alfo deferve to be confidered; and this in re<»ard our as rhofewho call themfelves Philofophers ought to have Knowledge follows the Nature of our Ideas. If the Ideas

been, our Acquaintance with the Bodies here about us. and our Infight into their Powers and Operations, had been yet much greater. As to the third fort, the Agree- ment or Difagreement of our Ideas in any other Relation; this is the largeft Field of Knowledge, and it is hard to determine how far it may extend : this Part depending on ourSagacity in finding intermediate Ideas, that may /hew the Habitudes and Relations of Ideas, it is an hard matter to tell when we are at an end of fuch Difcoveri

hofe Agreement or Difagreement we perceive, are ab- flract, our Knowledge is univerfal; for what is known of fuch general Ideas, will be true of every particular thing in which that Effence, that is, that abflract Idea is found : And what is once known of fuch Ideas, will be perpetually and for ever true; fo that, as to all general Knowledge, we muft fearch, and find it only in our own Minds; and it is only the examining our own Ideas that furnifhes us with it. Truths belonging to Effences of

They, who are ignorant of Algebra, cannot imagine the Things (that is, to abflract Ideas) are eternal, and are Wonders of this kind that are to be done by it: and what to be found out by the Contemplation only of thofe Ef- farther Improvements and Helps, advantageous to other fences; as the Exiftence of Things is to be known only Parts of Knowledge, the fagacious Mind of Man may yet from Experience. As to the Reality of our Knowledge, find out, it is not eafy to determine. This at leaft we it is evident, that the Mind knows not Things immediate- may believe, that the Ideas of Quantity are not thofe ly, but by the Intervention of the Ideasithasof them.

alone that are capable of Demontlration and Knowledge; and that other, and perhaps more ufeful Parts of Con- templation would afford us Certainty, if Vices, Pa/lions, and domineering Intereft did not oppofe or menace En- deavours of this kind.

The Idea of a fupreme Being, infinite in Power, Gond- nefs, and Wifdom, whofc Workman/hip we are, and on whom we depend; and the Idea of outfclvcs, as under-

Our Know/edge therefore is real only fo far, as there is a Conformity between our Ideas, and the Reality of Things. But how /hall we know when our Ideas agree with Things themfelves » To which it isanfwered, There are two Sorts of Ideas, that we may be affured agree with Things; thefe are, (1.) Simple Ideas, which fince the Mind can by no means make to itfelf, mult be the Effect of Things operating upon the Mind in a natural way, and

/landing rational Creatures; would, if duly confidered, producing therein thofe Perceptions, which, by the Will afford fuch Foundations of our Duty, and Rules of Ac- of our Maker, they are ordained and adapted to. Hence

it follows, that fimple Ideas are nor Fictions of our Fan- cies, but the natural and regular Produflions of Things without us, really operating upon us; which carry with them all the Conformity our State requires, which is to reprefent Things under thofe Appearances they are ftt- tett to produce in us. Thus the Idea of Whitenefs, as it is in the Mind, exactly anfwers that Power which is

tjon, as might place Morality among the Sciences capa- ble of Demdnftration; wherein we need not doubt, but that from Principles as jnconteftable as thofe of the Ma- thematicks, by ncceffary Confequenccs the Meafure of Right and Wrong might be made out to any one, who will apply himfeif, with the fame Indifferency and At- tention to the one, as he doth to the other of thefe Sci-

ences. The Relations of other Modes may certainly be in any Body to produce it there; and this Conformity perceived, as well as thofe of Number and Extenfion. between our fimple Ideas, and the Exiftence of Things Where there is no Property, there is no Injuttice, is a is fufficient for real Knowledge. (1.) All our complex Propofition as certain as any Demonftration in Euclid; for Ideas, except thofe of Subftances, being Archetypes of the Idea of Property being a Right to any thing, and the the Mind's own making, and not referred to the Exiftence Idea of Injuftice being the Invafion or Violation of that of Things as to their Originals, cannot want any Confer- Right, it is evident, that thefe Ideas being thus efta- miry neceffary to real Knowledge; for that which is not

bli/hed, arid thefe Names annexed to them, I can as certainly know this Propofition to be true, as that a Tri- angle has three Angles equal to two right ones. Again, no Government allows abfolutc Liberry; the Idea of Go-

defigned to reprefent any thing but itfelf, can never be capable of a wrong Reprefentation. Here the Ideas themfelves are confidered as Archetypes, and Things no otherwife regarded than as conformable to them. Thu

vcrnment being the Eftablifhment of Society, upon cer- the Mathematician confiders the Truth and Properties De- tain Rules or Laws, which require Conformity to them; longing to a Rectangle or Circle only, as they are Ideas and the Idea of abfolute Liberty being for any one to do in his own Mind, which poffibly he never found exifting whatever he plcafes, I am as capable of being certain of mathematically, that is, "precifely true; yet his Know- the Truth of this Propofition, as of any in Mathema- ledge is not only certain, but real, becaufe real Things

are no farther concerned, nor intended to be meant by any fuch Propofitions, than as Things really agree to thofe Archetypes in the Mind. It is true of the Idea of a Triangle, that its three Angles are equal to two rioht ones; it is true alfo of a Triangle, where-ever it exifts : What is true of thofe Figures, that have barely an Ideal ?-"'ftence in the Mind, will hold true of them alfo, when

ticks.

What has given the Advantage to the Ideas of Quan- tity, and made them thought to be more capable of Cer- taintyand Demonftration, is, Firjl, That they can be re- prefented by fenfible Marks, which have a nearer Corre- fpondence with them than any Words or Sounds. Dia- grams drawn on Paper are Copies of the Ideas, and not liable to the Uncertainty that Words carry in their Signi-

they come to have a real Exiftence in Matter. Hence 1 fication; but we have no fenfible Marks that refemble follows, that moral Knowledge is as capable of real Cer

our moral Ideas, and nothing but Words to exprefs them by, which tho', when written, they remain the fame; yet the Ideas they ftand for may change in the fame Man and it is veryfcldom that they are not different in diffe

tainty as Marhematicks : For Certainty being nothir but the Perception of fuch Agreement, by the Interven- tion of other Ideas, our moral Ideas, as well as mathe- matical, being Archetypes themfelves, and fo adequate