Page:Cyclopaedia, Chambers - Volume 1.djvu/55

ABS (10) ABS Body, or Person ; tho they cannot have any real Subsistence without such Subjects, nor the Subjects without them.

Thus, also, Whiteness is an Abstract, or abstract Term ; inasmuch as it does not denote any one white Object, but that Colour or Idea in the general, wherever sound. See GENERAL.

From the Knowledge of Abstracts we arrive at that of Concretes, which is the opposite Term ; Concrete denoting a General or Abstract Idea's being attach'd to same particular Subject, or consider'd as combin'd with some other Ideas ; as, great House, white Wall. See CONCRETE.

The School Philosophers define an Abstract Term from the Simplicity of its Signification.— Abstracts, according to them, express only the Forms of Things, or Attributes of Things, distinct from the Subjects whereof they are Forms or Attributes : as, Justice, Crookedness, &c.— They distinguish 'em into divers Kinds ; Metaphysical, as Humanity ; Logical, as Whiteness ; and Physical, as Life, in respect of an Animal.

All our simple Ideas, says Mr. Locke, have abstract, as well as concrete Names 3 as, Whiteness, white ; Sweetness, sweet, &c.

The like also holds in our Idea of Modes, and Relations ; as, Justice, just ; Equality, equal ; &c.

But as to our Ideas of Substances, we have very few abstract Names at all— Those few that the Schools have forged, as Animalitas, Humanitas, &c. hold no Proportion with the infinite Number of Names of Substances ; and could never get admittance into common Use, or obtain the Licence of publick Approbation : which seems to intimate a Confession of Mankind, that they have no Ideas of the real Essences of Substances ; since they have not Names for such Ideas.

It was only the Doctrine of Substantial Forms, and the Confidence of mistaken Pretenders to a Knowledge they had not, which first coined, and then introduced Animalitas, Humanitas, and the like ; which yet went very little farther than their own Schools, and could never get to be current among understanding Men. See SUBSTANCE.

But the Reality and Exigence of all Abstract Ideas, and of any such Faculty in the Mind as Abstraction, has of late been controverted. See the Article ABSTRACTION.

In effect, is there were any such Things as Abstracts, Abstract Qualities, &c. we don't see how they could be destroy'd ; they must be permanent and immutable : For that which destroys the white warm Flame, cou'd not reach the Whiteness or the Warmth : That which destroys the figured, moving, solid Ball, could not hurt the Figure, Motion, Solidity, &c.— Abstract Ideas, in fine, seem to tend to Substantial Forms. See SUBSTANTIAL FORM.

ABSTRACT is also extended to divers other Things, in respect of their Purity, Simplicity, Subtility, &c. In this Sense, we say,

ABSTRACT MATHEMATICKS, are those Branches of Mathematical Learning, which consider Quantity and its Affections, simply, and absolutely. See QUANTITY, and MATHEMATICS.

Such are Arithmetic, Algebra, Geometry, Trigonometry, and Analyticks. See ARITHMETIC, ALGEBRA, GEOMETRY, &c.

They are thus denominated, in opposition to Mixt Mathematicks ; where the simple and abstracted Properties and Relations of Quantity deliver'd in the former, are applied to sensible Objects ; and by that means become intermix'd with Physical Considerations Such are Hydrostatics, Optics, Navigation, &c. where Water, Light, &c. are concern'd.

In the like Sense some Authors speak of Abstract Numbers ; meaning no more thereby than Numbers, or Assemblages of Unities, consider'd in themselves, and not applied to denote any Collections of particular sorts of Things. See NUMBER.

ABSTRACT is also used in Matters of Literature, for a compendious View, or Epitome of a larger Work. See EPITOME.

An Abstract is supposed to be a degree shorter, and more superficial than an Abridgment. See ABRIDGMENT.

ABSTRACTION,, an Operation of the Mind, whereby we separate Things naturally conjunct, or existing together ; and form and consider Ideas of Things thus separated. See ABSTRACT.

The Faculty of Abstracting, stands directly opposite to that of Compounding — By Composition we consider those Things together, which in reality are not join'd together in one Existence. And by Abstraction, we consider those Things separately and apart, which in reality do not exist apart. See COMPOSITION.

Abstraction is chiefly employ'd these three ways— First, when the Mind considers any one Part of a Thing, in some respects distinct from the Whole ; as a Man's Arm, without the Consideration of the rest of his Body.

Secondly, when we consider the Mode of any Substance, omitting the Substance it self; or when we separately consider several Modes which subsist together in one Subject. See MODE.

This Abstraction the Geometricians make use of, when they consider the Length of a Body separately, which they call a Line ; omitting the Consideration of its Breadth and Depth.

Thirdly, it is by Abstraction that the Mind frames general or universal Ideas ; omitting the Modes and Relations of the particular Objects whence they are form'd. — Thus, when we would understand a thinking Being in general, we gather from our Self-consciousness what it is to Think ; and omitting the Consideration of those Things which have a peculiar Relation to our own Mind, or to the human Mind, we think of a thinking Being in general.

Ideas fram'd thus, which are what we properly call Abstract Ideas, become general Representatives of all Objects of the same Kind ; and their Names applicable to whatever exists conformable to such Ideas. — Thus, the Colour that we receive from Chalk, Snow, Milk, &c. is a Representative of all of that Kind ; and has a Name given it, Whiteness, which signifies the same Quality, wherever sound or imagin'd. See GENERAL.

'Tis this last Faculty, or Power of Abstracting, according to Mr. Locke, that makes the great Difference between Man and Brutes ; even those latter must be allowed to have some share of Reason : That they really reason in some Cases, seems almost as evident as that they have Sense ; but 'tis only in particular Ideas. They are tyed up to those narrow Bounds ; and do not seem to have any Faculty of enlarging them by Abstraction. Essay on Human Understanding, L. III. c. 3.

Such is the Doctrine of Abstract Ideas, under the Improvements of that excellent Author. In effect, 'tis the standing Opinion, that the Mind has such a Power or Faculty of framing Abstract Ideas or Notions of Things ; and on such very Ideas do a great part of the Writings of Philosophers turn. These are supposed in all their Systems ; and without them there would be nothing done. — They are more especially reputed the Object of Logick and Metaphysicks, and all that passes under the Notion of the mott abstracted and sublime Learning.

Yet has a late eminent and ingenious Author, Dean Berkeley, contested the Reality of any such Ideas ; and gone a good way towards overturning the whole System, and consequently towards setting our Philosophy on a new footing.

The Qualities or Modes of Things, 'tis on all hands agreed, do never really exist apart, and separated from all others ; but are constantly mix'd and combin'd together, several in the same Object. — But, say the Philosophers, the Mind being able to consider each Quality singly, or abstracted from other Qualities with which it is united, does by that meansframe to it self Abstract Ideas, of a different Nature and Kind from the sensible ones.

For an Example hereof, The Eye perceiving an Object extended, coloured, and moved, resolves this Compound Idea, into its simple, constituent ones ; and viewing each by it self, exclusive of the rest, frames Abstract Ideas of Fxtension, Colour, and Motion themselves, or in their own Nature. — Not that it is possible for such Colour and Motion to exist without Extension ; but only that the Mind can frame to it self, by Abstraction, the Idea of Colour exclusive of Extension; and of Motion, exclusive both of Colour and Extension.

Again, say the same Philosophers, the Mind having observ'd that in the particular Extensions perceived by Sense, there is something common, and alike in all ; and some; other things peculiar ; as this, or that Figure or Magnitude, which distinguish them one from another ; it can consider apart, or single out by it self, what is common ; making thereof a general abstract Idea of Extension, which is neither Line, Surface, nor Solid, nor has any Figure or Magnitude, but is an Idea entirely prescinded from 'em all. -

So, likewise, by leaving out of the several Colours perceived by Sense, that which distinguishes them from one another, and only retaining what is common to all, it makes an Idea of Colour in the Abstract, which is neither red, nor blue, nor white, &c. — After the same manner, by considering Motion abstractedly, both from the Body moved, and from the Figure it desribes, and all particular Directions, and Velocities ; an Abstract Idea of Motion is framed, which equally corresponds to all Motions whatever.

They add, that as the Mind frames Abstract Ideas of Qualities or Modes ; so does it, by the same Faculty, attain Abstract Ideas of the more compound Beings, which include many coexistent Qualities. - For an Example — Having observ'd that Peter, James, John, &c. resemble each other in Shape, and other Qualities ; we can leave out of the Complex Idea we had of Peter, James, &c. that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is common to all, and so make an Abstract Idea, wherein all the Particulars equally