Page:Cyclopaedia, Chambers - Volume 1.djvu/262

 BOD

C "O

BOD

The Order in which we arrive at the Knowledge of the Exiftence of Bodies, feems to be this ; We firft find we have Senfations ; then obferve we have not thofe Senfati- ons when we pleafe ; and thence conclude, we are not the abfolute Caufe thereof, but that there is requir'd forae other Caufe for their Production. Thus we begin to know, that we don't exift alone, but that there are feveral other things in the World together with us. But even this Dr. Clark owns to fail of a Demonftration of the Exiftence of a corporeal World : He adds, that all the Proof we have of it is this ■ That God would not create us fuch, as that all the Judgments we make about 'things exifting without us, mult neceffarily be falfe. If there be no External Bo- dies, it follows, that 'tis God who reprefents the Appea- rances of 'Bodies to us ; and that he does it in fuch a man- ner as to deceive us. Some think this has the Force of a Demonftration : 'Tis evident God can't deceive us 5 'tis evident he does deceive and delude us every Moment, if there be no Bodies 5 'tis evident therefore, there muft be Bodies.

Againft the Ex/Jlcnce of Bodies, or any External World, Mr. Berkley argues very ftrenuoufly, " That neither our " Thoughts, Paffions,' nor Ideas form'd by the Imaginati- " on, exift without the Mind, he obferves is allow'd ; and " that the various Senfations imprefs'd on the Mind, " whatever Objects they compofe, cannot exift otherwife " than in a Mind perceiving them, is not lefs evident : " This appears from the meaning of the Term Exift, " when apply'd to fenlible Things. Thus, the Table I write " Study, I fhould fay it exifted ; /". e. Were I in my Study, " I fhould fee and feel it as before. There was an Odor; " /. e. I fmelt it, &c. But the Exiftence of unthinking " Beings, without any Relation to their beingperceiv'd, is " unintelligible ; their Effe is 'Pcrcipi : Nor is it poflible " perceives them. " The Notion of Bodies, he en- deavours to fhew founded on the Doctrine of AbftraB Ideas : " What are Light and Colours, Heat and <c or Impreflions on the Senfe ? And is it poflible to fepa- " rate, even in Thought, any of thefe from Perception ? " The feveral Bodies then, that compofe the Frame of the " World, have not any Subfiftence without a Minds, their " Effe is to be perceiv'd or known; and as long as they are tc not perceiv'd by Me, nor any other thinking Being, they
 * ' on exifts ; i. e. I fee and feel it ; and were I out of my
 * ' they fhould have any Exiftence out of the Mind that
 * ' Cold, Extension and Figures, in a word, the Things
 * e we fee and feel, but fo many Senfations, Notions, Ideas,


 * ' have no fhadow of Exiftence at all. .The things we

" perceive, are Colour, Figure, Motion, ££?c. that is, the 4t Ideas of thofe things : But has an Idea any Exiftence tc as to perceive : That therefore wherein Colour, Figure, " &c. exiit, muft perceive them. 'Tis evident, therefore, " there can be no unthinking Sitbftance, or Subftratum of u thofe Ideas. But you will argue, If the Ideas themfelves " don't exiit without the Mind, there may be Things like ct 'em, whereof they are Copies or Refemblances, which C( like nothing but an Idea ; a Colour or Figure can be like " nothing elfe but another Figure or Colour. It may be " farther ask'd, whether thofe fuppofed Originals, or Ex- " ternal things whereof our Ideas are the Pictures, be <l themfelves perceiveable or not ? If they be, they are ic Ideas; if they be not, I appeal to any one whether it be Ct Senfe to fay, A Colour is like fomewhat which is Invifi- " ble ; hard or foft, like fomewhat Intangible, &c. Some Ct diftingui/h between Primary and Secondary Qualities; c< the former, viz. Extenfion, Solidity, Figure, Motion, " Reft and Number, they maintain have a real Exiftence t£ other fenfible Qualities, as Colours, Sounds, Taftes, &c. " they allow the Ideas we have of 'em, are not Refem- Ct blances of any things exifting without the Mind, or « unperceiv'd ; but depend on the Size, Texture, Motion, " &c. ok the minute Particles of Matter : Now 'tis cer-' " tain, that thofe Primary Qualities are infeparably united " with the other Secondary ones, and cannot even in 1 « Thought be abftracted from them ; and therefore muft " only^ exift in the Mind. Can any Man conceive the Ex- " fible Qualitys ? For my part, 1 find it impoflible to " frame an Idea of a Body extended and moving, without " giving it fome Colour, &c. In effect, Extenfion, Fi- l * gure and Motion, abrtracted from all other Qualities, are t£ Inconceivable: Where the others, therefore, are, there " thefe too muft be ; i.e. in the Mind, and no where elfe. % \ Again, Great and Small, Swift and Slow, are allow'd to " exift no where without the Mind ; being merely relative, " and changing, as the Frame or Pofition of the Organ " changes ; The Extenfion therefore that exifts without the <l. Mind, is neither great nor fmall, the Motion neither
 * c out of the Mind ? To have an Idea, is the fame thing
 * ' exift without the Mind: 'Tis anfwer'd, an Idea, can be
 * ; £ out of the Mind : For the latter, under which come all
 * tenfion and Motion of a Body, without all the other fen-

".lwift nor flow ; i. e. they are nothing. That Num-


 * .. . 3

" ber is a Creature of the Mind, is plain (even tho the ct other Qualities were allow'd to exift) from this ; that ct the fame thing bears a different Denomination of Num- " ber, as the Muid views it with different Refpecls : Thus tc the fame Extenfion is 1, or 3, or 3d, as the Mind con- <c fiders it, with reference to a Yard, a Foot, or an Inch. " Nay, many of the modern Geometricians hold, that a " finite Line may be divided into an infinite Number of tl Parts, and each of thofe Infinitefimals into an infinity of u others ; and fo on, in Infinitum : So that the fame 11 Thing is either Unity or Infinity ; either no Number or " all Number. In effect, after the fame manner as the £c modern Philofophers prove Colours, Taftes, ££?c. to have " no Exiftence in Matter, or without the Mind ; the fame " thing may be proved of all fenfible Qualities whatfo- (t ever. Thus, they fay, Heat and Cold are only Affec- t£ tions of the Mind, not at all Patterns of real Beings ex- t( ifting in corporeal Subftances ; for that the fame Body tc which feems cold to one hand, feems warm to another. <( Now why may we not as well argue, that Figure and Ct Extenfion are not Patterns or Refemblances of Qualities " exifting in Matter; becaufe to the fame Eye, at different c< Stations, or to Eyes of different Structure at the fame " Station, they appear various ? Again, Sweetnefs, 'tis tc proved, does not exift in the Thing fapid 5 becaufe the " Thing remaining unalter'd, the Sweetnefs is chang'd to u Bitternefs, as in a Fever, or otherwife vitiated Palate. " Is it not as reafonable to fay, that Motion does not exift tl out of the Mind ? fince if the Succeflion of Ideas in the " Mind become fwifter, the Motion, 'tis acknowledg'd, " will appear flower, without any external Alteration. — lc Again, were it poflible for folid figur'd Bodies to exift " out of the Mind, yet it were impofflble for us ever to " know it : Our Senfes, indeed, give us Senfations or " Ideas, but don't tell us that any Thing exifts without " the Mind, or unperceiv'd, like thofe which are perceiv'd : ct This the Materialifts allow. No other way therefore re- " mains, but that we know 'em by Reafons inferring their 4t Exiftence from what is immediately perceiv'd by Senfe. " But how fhould Reafon do this, when 'tis confefs'd there

is not any neceffary Connection between our Senfations and thefe Bodies ? 'Tis evident from the 1?hcenofflena of

' l Dreams, Phrenfies, &c. that we may be affected with '* the Ideas we now have, tho there were no Bodies exif- " ting without them : Nor does the Supposition of external " Bodies at all forward us, in conceiving how our Ideas " fhould come to be produe'd. The Materialifts own " themfelves unable to conceive in what manner Body can " act on Spirit ; or how it fhould imprint any Idea on the " Mind. To fuppofe therefore Bodies exifting without " the Mind, is little elfe than to.fuppofe, God has created " innumerable Beings entirely ufelefs, and ferving to no " Purpofe at all. On the whole, it appears that the Exif- " fence of Bodies out of a Mind perceiving 'em, is not only " impofliblc, and a Contradiction in Terms ; but were it " poflible, nay real, it were impoflible we fhould ever " know it. And again, that fuppofmg there are no fuch 11 Things, yet we fhould have the very fame Reafon to " fuppofe there were that we now have : Suppofe, v.g. an '* Intelligence affected with the fame Train of Senfations, tc imprefs'd in the fame Order, and with the fame Vivid- tl nets ; would it not have all the Reafon to believe the " Exiftence of Bodies reprefented by his Ideas that we

tl have? All our Ideas and Senfations are vifibly Inac-

" tive ; nay, the very Being of an Idea implies Paflivenefs " and Inertnefs : So that it is impoflible for an Idea to do " any thing ; or, in ftrictnefs, be the Caufe of any thing : " It cannot therefore be the Refemblance or Pattern of' " any active Being ; unlefs Oppofites can be faid torefem- " ble one another.

" Now we find a continual Succeflion of Ideas in the " Mind; but thefe, it has been proved, don't depend on «: any External Body as their Caufe : It remains therefore, " that their Caufe is an Incorporeal active Subjiance or " Spirit. For that I am not the Caufe of my own Ideas, " is plain from this, that when I open my Eyes in broad " Day-light, I can't help feeing various Objects. Now the " fix'd Rules or Methods wherein the Mind we depend on « excites in us the Ideas of Senfe, are call'd Laws of tfa- " ture ;Thefe we learn by Experience ; which teaches us, " that fuch and fuch Ideas are attended with fuch and

" fuch other Ideas in the ordinary Courfe of Things. ■

" Ideas are not any how, and at random produced ; there ( * is a certain Order and Connexion eftablim'd among 'em, u like that of Caufe and Effeft : And there are feveral " Combinations of 'em made in a very regular artful Man- " ner, which we call Bodies ; and the Syftem of thofe, the " World. In ftrictnefs, however, the Connexion of Ideas " does not imply the Relation of Caufe and Effect ; but, " only of a Mark or Sign of the Thing fignify'd : The " Fire I fee is not the Caufe of the Pain I feel, but the " Mark that forewarns me of it. The Noife I hear, is