Page:Culbertson v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security.pdf/2

2 :(a) Section 406(b) provides that a court rendering a favorable judgment to a claimant “represented before the court by an attorney” may award “a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent” of past-due benefits. Here, the adjective “such,” which means “[o]f the kind or degree already described or implied,” refers to the only form of representation “already described” in §406(b)–i. e., “represent[ation] before the court.” Thus, the 25% cap applies only to fees for representation before the court, not the agency.
 * Subsections (a) and (b) address different stages of the representation and use different methods for calculating fees. Given this statutory structure, applying §406(b)’s 25% cap on court-stage fees to §406(a) agency-stage fees, or the aggregate of §§406(a) and (b) fees, would make little sense. For example, such a reading would subject §406(a)(1)’s reasonableness limitation to §406(b)’s 25% cap–a limitation not included in the relevant provision of the statute. Had Congress wanted agency-stage fees to be capped at 25%, it presumably would have said so directly in subsection (a). Pp. 5–7.
 * (b) The fact that the agency presently withholds a single pool of 25% of past-due benefits for direct payment of agency and court fees does not support an aggregate reading. The statutory text provides for two pools of money for direct payment of fees. See §§406(a)(4), (b)(1)(A). The agency’s choice to withhold only one pool of 25% of past-due benefits does not alter this text. More fundamentally, the amount of past-due benefits that the agency can withhold for direct payment does not delimit the amount of fees that can be approved for representation before the agency or the court. Pp. 7–9.

861 F. 3d 1197, reversed and remanded.

, delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.