Page:Cruz v. Arizona (2023).pdf/6

Rh Carolina, 534 U. S. 246, 248, 251–252 (2002).

The same year this Court decided Simmons, Arizona amended its parole statute to abolish parole for all felonies committed after 1993. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §41–1604.09(I)(1) (1994). Nevertheless, Arizona’s capital sentencing statute continued to list two alternatives to death: (1) “natural life,” which barred release “on any basis,” and (2) “life” with the possibility of “release” after at least 25 years. §13–751(A). Because of the elimination of parole, however, the only “release” available to capital defendants convicted after 1993 was, and remains, executive clemency.

Despite the elimination of parole for capital defendants, the Arizona Supreme Court held, in a series of cases commencing with Cruz’s direct appeal, that Simmons did not apply in Arizona because the State’s sentencing scheme was sufficiently distinct from the one at issue in Simmons. That line of cases culminated in State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 357 P. 3d 119 (2015). There, the Arizona Supreme Court refused to apply Simmons on the ground that Lynch could have received a life sentence under §13–751(A) and thus been eligible for “executive clemency” after 25 years. 238 Ariz., at 103–104, 357 P. 3d, at 138–139.

This Court summarily reversed in Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U. S. 613, holding that Simmons applies with full force in Arizona. The Court noted that “Simmons expressly rejected the argument that the possibility of clemency diminishes a capital defendant’s right to inform a jury of his parole ineligibility.” 578 U. S., at 615. The Court also observed that Simmons foreclosed the State’s alternative argument that relied on the potential for future legislative reforms to Arizona’s parole statute. 578 U. S., at 616.