Page:Cruz v. Arizona (2023).pdf/18

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, with whom, , and join, dissenting.

The adequate and independent state grounds doctrine is the product of two fundamental features of our jurisdiction. First, this Court is powerless to revise a state court’s interpretation of its own law. Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 636 (1875). We thus cannot disturb state-court rulings on state-law questions that are independent of federal law. Second, Article III empowers federal courts to render judgments, not advisory opinions. Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792). So if an independent state ground of decision is adequate to sustain the judgment, we lack jurisdiction over the entire dispute. Anything we said about alternative federal grounds would not affect the ultimate resolution of the case and would therefore be advisory. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 126 (1945).

The Court holds that the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of Rule 32.1(g) is inadequate to support the judgment below. That assertion is jarring, because the bar for finding inadequacy is extraordinarily high. When, as here, the argument is based on the state court’s inconsistent or novel application of its law, the bar is met only by a decision so blatantly disingenuous that it reveals hostility to federal rights or those asserting them. See Walker v. Martin, 562 U. S. 307, 321 (2011). Given the respect we owe state