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10 Ariz. 402, 412, 492 P. 3d 1020, 1030 (2021) (determining that a decision of this Court was not a “significant change in the law” in part because it did not “effec[t] a change in Arizona law”). Here, however, the Arizona Supreme Court considered only whether there had been a significant change in federal law, disregarding the fact that Lynch overruled binding Arizona Supreme Court precedents, to dramatic effect for capital defendants in Arizona.

The consequences of the interpretation below compound its novelty. Arizona requires a petitioner seeking Rule 32.1(g) relief to establish not just a “significant change in the law,” but also that the law in question applies retroactively under this Court’s analysis in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). See, e.g., State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 389, 64 P. 3d 828, 831 (2003) (applying Teague). Under Arizona’s longstanding Rule 32.1(g) precedents, it is possible to satisfy both criteria. See, e.g., State v. Rose, Order in No. CR2007–149013–002 (Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty., Ariz., Aug. 14, 2020) (determining in another case, prior to the decision below, that Lynch was both a “significant change in the law” and satisfied retroactivity because it “merely applied the rule of Simmons”). On the interpretation adopted below, however, it is impossible for Cruz, and similarly situated capital defendants, to obtain relief. To show retroactivity, Cruz argued before the Arizona Supreme Court that Lynch applied “settled” federal law. Under the decision below, however, that same argument implies that Lynch was not a “significant change in the law.” The fact that the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in this case generates this catch-22, whereas earlier Rule 32.1(g) decisions did not, further underscores the novelty of the decision and its departure from pre-existing Arizona Supreme Court law.

Under these unusual circumstances, the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of Rule 32.1(g) to Lynch was so novel and unfounded that it does not constitute an adequate state procedural ground. It is therefore not necessary to