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2 Since the founding, the First Amendment has allowed the government to regulate certain “areas of speech” “because of their constitutionally proscribable content.” R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 382–383 (1992) (emphasis deleted). This includes true threats, which are “serious expression[s] of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U. S. 343, 359 (2003); see also R. A. V., 505 U. S., at 388 (“[T]hreats of violence are outside the First Amendment”). True threats carry little value and impose great cost. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942) (“[A]ny benefit that may be derived from [true threats] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality”). “[B]y their very utterance,” true threats “inflict injury.” Ibid. They provoke “the fear of violence,” create “disruption,” give rise to “the possibility that the threatened violence will occur”—and the list goes on. Black, 538 U. S., at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The nature of a true threat points to an objective test for determining the scope of First Amendment protection: Neither its “social value” nor its potential for “injury” depends on the speaker’s subjective intent. Chaplinsky, 315 U. S., at 572. They can relate, of course—a speaker who does not intend to threaten is less likely to utter a statement that could be taken that way. But the Constitution ultimately declines to protect true threats for objective reasons, not