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20 purveyance’ of a threat would require that [a defendant] know the threatening nature of his communication.” Id., at 739.

The considerations that drove this Court to approve a higher mens rea for obscenity apply here as well. With obscenity, the ambiguity comes partly from the reliance on “ ‘contemporary community standards’ ” to define what is obscene. Hamling, 418 U. S., at 129. Such a standard is notoriously amorphous, and will change a great deal between communities and over time. The same chilling concerns apply to true threats. A recklessness standard based on what a reasonable person could find threatening will depend on ever-shifting community norms around language and when heated speech crosses the line from overly aggressive to criminal. See.

Finally, the Court relies heavily upon this Court’s framework for defamation. Specifically, the Court analogizes to the “reckless disregard” standard for defamation of public figures or punitive damages for certain claims involving private figures. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279–280 (1964).

Yet while civil defamation may be “the best known and best theorized example” of unprotected speech,, the same does not go for criminal prosecution of defamation. It is true that this Court in 1964 invalidated a prosecution