Page:Counterman v. Colorado.pdf/36

Rh compensate for the ambiguities inherent in the definition of obscenity.’ ” Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 123 (1974). This is in line with this Court’s more general observation that “vagueness” of “content-based regulation of speech” is of “special concern” when it comes to “criminal statute[s].” Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 871–872 (1997).

Specifically, the Court has held that a “knowledge” mens rea is sufficient for obscenity: “It is constitutionally sufficient that the prosecution show that a defendant had knowledge of the contents of the materials he distributed, and that he knew the character and nature of the materials.” Hamling, 418 U. S., at 123. This ensures that “not innocent but calculated purveyance of filth … is exorcised.” Id., at 122 (internal quotation marks omitted). While the Court today asserts that this Court has “never determined the precise mens rea” for obscenity,, the Court has cited a knowledge standard approvingly for half a century, see Hamling, 418 U. S., at 123; Elonis, 575 U. S., at 739. Applying that standard to threats, the “ ‘calculated