Page:Costantino v. City of Detroit (162245) (2020) Order.pdf/6

6 Other audits, by contrast, aim to ensure accuracy in a specific election and enable alteration of results if necessary. The American Law Institute’s recent Principles of the Law, Election Administration, drafted around the time Proposal 3 was passed, suggests that audits should be used in this manner: "[I]f an audit exposes a problem, the number of randomly sampled ballots can be increased in order to ascertain whether or not the problem is one that threatens the accuracy of the determination of which candidate is the election’s winner. In an extreme case, when problems exposed by an audit were severe, the audit would need to turn into a full recount of all ballots in the election in order to provide the requisite confidence in the accuracy of the result (or, as necessary, to alter the result based on the findings of the audit-turned-recount). In those circumstances when the audit exposes no such problem, election officials ordinarily would be able to complete the audit prior to the deadline for certifying the results of the election; when, however, the audit reveals the necessity of a full recount, then a state—depending on how it chooses to structure the relationship between certification and a recount—either could delay certification until completion of the recount or issue a preliminary certification that is subject to revision upon completion of the recount. [ALI, Principles of the Law, Election Administration (2019), § 209, comment c.]"

These audits, such as a risk-limiting audit, “are designed to be implemented before the certification of the results, and to inform election officials whether they should be confident in the results—or if they should bump the audit up to a full recount.” Pettigrew & Stewart, Protecting the Perilous Path of Election Returns from the Precinct to the News, 16 Ohio St Tech L J 587, 636 (2020) (“[Risk-limiting audits] conducted as part of the certification process currently provide the best mechanism through which the manipulation of election returns at the precinct level can be detected and, most importantly, remedied.”). A review of election laws conducted in early 2018 similarly recommended that audits be undertaken “after preliminary outcomes are announced, but before official certification of election results” because this allows for “correction of preliminary results if preliminary election outcomes are found to be incorrect.” Root et al, Center for American Progress, Election Security in All 50 States: Defending America’s Elections (Feb 12, 2018), available at .

Whether the constitutional right to an audit may be utilized to uncover evidence of fraud to challenge the results of an election will also need to be addressed. In particular, how does the constitutional audit operate within our statutory framework and procedures for canvassing election returns, certifying the results, and disputing ballots on the basis of fraud? We have long indicated that canvassing boards’ role is ministerial and does not