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 also because the distinction between “work” and “material object” requires clarification. The term “literary works” does not connote any criterion of literary merit or qualitative value; it includes catalogs, directories and similar works.

Correspondingly, the definition of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” carries with it no implied criterion of artistic taste, aesthetic value, or intrinsic quality. The term is intended to comprise everything now covered by classes (f) through (k) of section 5 in the present statute, including not only “works of art” in the traditional sense but also works of graphic art and illustration, art reproductions, plans and drawings, photographs and reproductions of them, maps, charts, globes, and other cartographic works, works of these kinds intended for use in advertising and commerce, and work of “applied art.” There is no intention whatever to narrow the scope of the subject matter now characterized in section 5(k) as “prints or labels used for articles of merchandise.” However, since this terminology suggests the material object in which a work is embodied rather than the work itself, the bill does not mention this category separately.

In accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), works of “applied art” encompass all original pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works that are intended to be or have been embodied in useful articles, regardless of factors such as mass production, commercial exploitation, and the potential availability of design patent protection. The scope of exclusive rights in these works is given special treatment in section 113, to be discussed below.

Enactment of Public Law 92-140 marked the first recognition in American copyright law of sound recordings as copyrightable works. As defined in section 101, copyrightable “sound recordings” are original works of authorship comprising an aggregate of musical, spoken, or other sounds that have been fixed in tangible form. The copyrightable work comprises the aggregation of sounds and not the tangible medium of fixation. Thus, “sound recordings” as copyrightable subject matter are distinguished from “phonorecords,” the latter being physical objects in which sounds are fixed. They are also distinguished from any copyrighted literary, dramatic; or musical works that may be reproduced on a “phonorecord.”

As a class of subject matter, sound recordings are clearly within the scope of the “writings of an author” capable of protection under the Constitution, and the extension of limited statutory protection to them too long delayed. Aside from cases in which sounds are fixed by some purely mechanical means without originality of any kind, the copyright protection that would prevent the reproduction and distribution of unauthorized phonorecords of sound recordings is clearly justified.

The copyrightable elements in a sound recording will usually, though not always, involve “authorship” both on the part of the performers whose performance is captured and on the part of the record producer responsible for setting up the recording session, capturing and electronically processing the sounds, and compiling and editing them to make the final sound recording. There may be cases where the record producer’s contribution is so minimal that the performance is the only copyrightable element in the work, and there may be cases