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 which, inits statute of 1786, expressly "provided, that nothing in this act shall extend to, affect, prejudice, or confirm the rights which any person may have to the printing or publishing of any books or pamphlets at common law, in cases not mentioned in this act." But the N. Y. Supreme Court decided that the precedent of Wheaton v. Peters nevertheless held. During the discussion of the present copyright code, Edward Everett Hale consulted with other veteran authors whose early works were passing out of copyright, with the intention of bringing a test case for the extension of copyright under common law after the expiration of the statutory period. But on proposing such a case to legal counsel he became assured that such a suit could not be maintained.

As in the English case of Donaldson v. Becket, the decision in the American ruling case of Wheaton v. Peters came from a divided court. The opinion was handed down by Justice McLean, three other judges agreeing, Justices Thompson and Baldwin dissenting, a seventh judge being absent. The opinions of the dissenting judges, given in Eaton S. Drone's "A treatise on the law of property in intellectual productions," constitute one of the strongest statements ever made of natural rights in literary property, in opposition to the ruling that the right is solely the creature of the statute. "An author's right," says Justice Thompson, "ought to be esteemed an inviolable right established in sound reason and abstract morality." There seems, indeed, to be a sense of natural copyright among the American Indians; an Ojibwa brave will not sing the song belonging to another tribe or singer, and a Chippewa youth may learn his father's songs, on a customary gift of tobacco, but does not inherit the right to sing them.