Page:Copeland By and Through Copeland v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.pdf/6

 ordered and adjudged, pursuant to the Memorandum and Order. . . ,filed April 12, 1996, that plaintiff’s motion. . . is hereby granted as to approval of the settlement. The motion is denied as to the apportionment proposed by plaintiff." In a June 21, 1996 Journal Entry Apportioning Proceeds, the district court specifically apportioned $244,814.30 of the settlement proceeds to SRS, deducting from that amount litigation expenses and assessing a 33.33% attorney fee against SRS' share of the proceeds.

Before considering Copeland’s claims, we must first determine the threshold jurisdictional issue of whether her May 9 Notice of Appeal triggers appellate jurisdiction or was fatally premature.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2) provides that "[a] notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision or order but before the entry of the judgment or order is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry." The Supreme Court in FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Insurance Co., 498 U.S. 269 (1991), held that “Rule 4(a)(2) permits a notice of appeal filed from certain nonfinal decisions to serve as an effective notice from a subsequently