Page:Copeland By and Through Copeland v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.pdf/25

 § 39-719a(b). In so arguing, Copeland relies on passing references by the district court and parties to the hearing as a "trial." Copeland also relies on general definitions of the term "trial" to establish that the hearing constituted a trial.

Although the district court may have referred to the hearing as a "trial," this reference clearly does not constitute a determination, as Copeland suggests, that the hearing was a trial for purposes of § 39-719a(b). Further, the statutory language of § 39-719a(b), distinguishing cases settled before trial from cases settled after a trial is convened, contemplates the convening of a trial on the merits between the injured party and the third-party tortfeasor, and does not refer to proceedings following a settlement which only address the judicial approval of the settlement and the allocation of settlement proceeds.

In this case, Copeland settled with Toyota before a trial on the merits of the case was convened. The subsequent proceedings to apportion the proceeds were thus irrelevant to the determination, under § 39-719a(b), of what percentage of attorney fees applied to SRS’ recovery. This court therefore rejects Copeland’s argument that SRS should have been required to pay attorney fees in the amount of 40% of its medical assistance recovery.

The district court properly refused to apply Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-719a(c) to reduce SRS' recovery based on Copeland’s alleged negligence. The district court