Page:Copeland By and Through Copeland v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.pdf/24

 medical recipients' need to be compensated for their injuries against the need for conservation of public funds,” and has determined that, in general, "the public funds have priority." ''Coplien v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs.'', 349 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).

We accordingly reject Copeland’s arguments that the district court erred in refusing to eliminate SRS’ recovery based on the "made whole" rule or to reduce SRS' recovery on a proportionate basis.

Copeland finally argues that under § 39-719a(b), SRS should have to pay attorney fees in the amount of 40% rather than 33.33% of SRS' medical assistance recovery because a trial was convened. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-719a(b) provides that the court shall apportion attorney fees between SRS and the medical assistance recipient, but that SRS’ share of attorney fees may not exceed one-third of its medical assistance recovery "for cases settled prior to trial," or two-fifths of its medical assistance recovery "when a trial is convened." Under the clear and unambiguous language of this statutory provision, SRS’ share of attorney fees could not exceed one-third of its recovery because Copeland settled with Toyota before trial.

Copeland nevertheless contends that the hearing on the motions to approve the settlement and apportion the proceeds constituted a “trial” for purposes of