Page:Copeland By and Through Copeland v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.pdf/20

 thus provides the court with some discretion in allocating attorney fees. The subsection further provides, however, that the fees paid by SRS may not exceed either two-fifths or one-third of the medical assistance recovered, depending on whether there was a trial or a settlement prior to trial. ''See id.; cf. Walker v. District of Columbia'', 682 A.2d 639, 644 (D.C. 1996) (holding equitable principles statutorily abrogated partly because statute explicitly created exception to full reimbursement to government by requiring government to pay portion of medical assistance recipient’s attorney fees). Section 39-719a(c), as discussed previously, also places a limitation on SRS’ recovery when the injured party’s total damage award has been reduced as a result of negligence attributed to the party pursuant to § 60-258a. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-719a(c).