Page:Copeland By and Through Copeland v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.pdf/19

 [state agency providing medical assistance]” and stating that the clear intent of this language was to permit trial courts to exercise discretion in apportioning any recovery between the state and injured person). Specifically, there is no indication in § 39-719a that SRS is limited to recovering a pro rata share of the medical assistance recipient’s settlement proceeds, or that SRS may only recover if the recipient is fully compensated.

Although the statute does not indicate that SRS’ recovery is limited by general equitable principles, the statute does expressly place a number of specific limitations on SRS’ recovery. The primary statutory limitations on SRS' recovery are found in subsection (b) and subsection (c). Section 39-719a(b) provides for the allocation of attorney fees, stating that “the court shall fix attorney fees, which shall be paid proportionately by [SRS] and the injured person. . . in the amounts determined by the court." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-719a(b). This subsection