Page:Copeland By and Through Copeland v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.pdf/18

 We first note that § 39-719a contains no language explicitly providing that SRS’ subrogation right is limited by general equitable principles, nor is there language explicitly giving the court discretion to apportion proceeds according to such principles. ''Cf. Davis v. City of Chicago, 322 N.E.2d 29, 31-32 (Ill. 1974) (discussing statute providing that "[t]he court may determine what portion of the recovery shall be paid to the injured person and what portion shall be paid to the issue support the presumption that the Legislature was cognizant of the historical distinction between the two remedies and created a statutory lien as an alternate means to recover"); see also Indiana Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Larson'', 486 N.E.2d 546, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (stating “the equitable principles and discretion in determining reimbursement pursuant to a subrogation statute do not apply to reimbursement to the State for the Medicaid benefits” under statute providing only for a lien). These courts have not held, however, that the existence of a lien is a requirement for finding that equitable principles do not apply. Rather, a review of the cases interpreting medical assistance reimbursement statutes indicates that resolution of the issue is dependent on the particular language, provisions, and background of each statute.

In addition, although some courts have relied on the existence of a lien to determine that equitable principles have been abrogated, other courts have not found the creation of a lien to be determinative of legislative intent to retain or abrogate traditional equitable subrogation principles. See, e.g., Underwood v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 551 So.2d 522, 524-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding equitable principles apply to state’s subrogation right under former Florida statute, despite existence of lien provision); see also Walker v. District of Columbia, 682 A.2d 639, 643-44 (D.C. 1996) (relying on other provisions of statute creating subrogation right and lien, rather than distinctions between subrogation and lien provisions, in determining equitable principles were abrogated). Further, there are no cases holding that equitable principles necessarily apply in the absence of a lien. We therefore reject Copeland’s assertion that merely because the Kansas statute does not create a lien in addition to the subrogation right, the equitable principles advocated by Copeland are necessarily contained in the statute.