Page:Copeland By and Through Copeland v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.pdf/14

 The conclusion that § 39-719a(c) does not apply to the settlement in this case is consistent with the apparent purpose of the provision. When an injured party has been found by the fact finder at trial to be negligent and has therefore received a reduced damage award, § 39-719a(c) ensures that SRS' reimbursement for medical assistance may only be taken from the injured party's reduced damage award and not from the full damage determination. SRS' reimbursement for medical assistance payments will thus never exceed the actual damage award received by the injured party following a trial. In contrast to a fact finder’s total damage determination following a trial, no possibility exists that the injured party’s recovery in a settlement can be further reduced by a determination of that party’s negligence. Much like the situation of the court reducing the total damage determination by the percentage of the injured party’s own negligence following a trial, the amount of the settlement necessarily incorporates a reduction attributable to the injured party’s own negligence, if any. Thus, the concerns addressed by § 39-719a(c) are not implicated in cases when an injured party settles with the alleged tortfeasor.

We conclude that because § 39-719a(c) is inapplicable, the district court did not err in refusing to make a determination of Copeland’s negligence and did not err in refusing to reduce SRS' reimbursement of medical assistance based on Copeland’s alleged negligence.