Page:Confederate Military History - 1899 - Volume 7.djvu/623

140 a movement by which the army might attempt to cut off the enemy’s supplies from the Mississippi river. My own views were strongly expressed as unfavorable to any advance which would separate me farther from Vicksburg, which was my base. I did not, however, see fit to put my own judgment and opinions so far in opposition as to prevent a movement altogether, but believing the only possibility of success to be in the plan of cutting the enemy’s communications, it was adopted." Pemberton thereupon ordered an advance toward Raymond, intending to strike the main road at Dillon's, about ten miles from Edwards, and he sent a message to Johnston informing him, stating as his object ‘‘to cut the enemy’s communications and force him to attack me, as I do not consider my force sufficient to justify an attack on the enemy in position or to attempt to cut my way to Jackson." He also expressed a wish that Johnston would unite with him at Raymond.

Johnston, meanwhile, discovered soon after ordering Pemberton to attack Sherman at Clinton, that the latter intended to attack him (Johnston) at Jackson; and at 3 a.m. on the 14th, General Gregg, having been informed that Jackson must be evacuated, was ordered to hold back the Federals until Gen. John Adams should prepare his train and retreat on the Canton road. At 3 a. m. Gregg marched out for this purpose toward Clinton, while Colonel Colquitt, with Gist’s brigade, supported by Walker's, took an advanced position on the Raymond road. The Federal attacks were made almost simultaneously by McPherson on the Raymond road and Sherman on the Clinton road, but they were both held back, the troops behaving with the utmost coolness and courage, until 2 o’clock p.m., when the trains being on their way from the city, the Confederates withdrew in good order. There was much spirited fighting and the Federal loss was 42 killed, 241 wounded and 7 missing; the Confederate loss 17 killed, 64 wounded and 118 missing.