Page:Confederate Military History - 1899 - Volume 4.djvu/67

Rh offensive beyond description. Fires were strictly for bidden by day and night. The sick lists increased by thousands, and cases occurred where men actually died in the mud and water of the trenches before they could be taken out to the hospitals. Then General Alexander adds a fact that shows the intense earnestness with which these men were imbued: "Not only were there no murmurs or complaints, but in the midst of all this, the terms of enlistments of a large part of the army expired, and they at once re-enlisted for three years or the war.’&quot;

By May 4th the retreating Confederates had reached the line of fortifications around Fort Magruder, just below the old town of Williamsburg. On that day the Federal cavalry and infantry pressed the Confederate rear so closely that the trains became imperiled. Hence, the battle fought there on the 5th of May was not from Confederate choice, but from the necessity of the hour. The Northern reports, and indeed many Northern writers, show an entire misconception of the purpose of this battle. They seem to think that it was part of Johnston’s purpose to hold permanently the Fort Magruder line. Keyes says in his official report: &quot;If Hancock had failed, the enemy would not have retreated.&quot; This is far from the true state of affairs. As Colonel Maury observes: &quot;General Johnston had no intention of tarrying at Williamsburg, nor was the place defensible, for the enemy now had control of both York and James rivers, on each flank, and intended to push Franklin s division, kept on transports. . . rapidly up the York river in the vain hope of getting in our rear.&quot; General Johnston says: &quot;It was an affair with our rearguard, the object of which was to secure our baggage trains, &quot; General Webb, of the Federals, observes: &quot;The demonstration of the Union cavalry the previous afternoon, and Hooker’s pressure the next morning, compelled them to face —