Page:Confederate Military History - 1899 - Volume 4.djvu/103

Rh should have declared, &quot;Malvern Hill was magnificent; but it was not war, it was murder. The simple record of the destruction wrought in one hour sickens and depresses the mind.

The necessity for further retreat after Frayser’s Farm caused General McClellan to send General Porter "to select and hold a position behind which the army and all its trains could be withdrawn in safety. One glance at the natural amphitheater formed by Malvern Hill, with its plateau terminating in streams, ravines and tangled woods, revealed to Porter s trained eye that there was an ideal place for a defensive battle. The hill commanded nearly all the roads. Porter says: &quot;The hill was flanked with ravines, enfiladed by our fire. The ground in front was sloping, and over it our artillery and infantry, themselves protected by the crest and ridges, had clear sweep for their fire. In all directions, for several hundred yards, the land over which an attacking force must advance was almost entirely clear of forest, and was generally cultivated. &quot;

All day long on June 20th, and far into the night, regiments, brigades, divisions were, as they arrived, posted under Porter s personal direction to take full advantage of the crests and depressions. For the first time in the Seven Days battles, all of McClellan s army was concentrated on one field. Artillery, to do more effective service here and at Gettysburg than in any other battles of the four years, rumbled heavily into position in nature s own emplacements. As far as the eye could see, battery after battery rose tier upon tier around the curvature of the hill, the whole surmounted by Tyler’s long-range siege guns. Both armies were worn by constant fighting by day and marching by night, but both nerved themselves for the coming ordeal. With a confidence born of previous successes against that same —