Page:Confederate Military History - 1899 - Volume 1.djvu/547



THE political battle of 1864 set in array at the North on the side of the administration was vehemently pronounced to be based on condemnation of secession, vindication of coercion, abolition of slavery and subjugation of the seceding States. It was urged that the defeat of Lincoln would be a Northern approval of disunion, a rebuke of the armies, and re-establishment of the arrogant slave power. In the temper of the times there was but a little chance of so directing Northern popular sentiment as to change the administration of the government in the midst of war. War was party necessity and the source of its power. An armistice as suggested by the opposition might be fatal to party supremacy. It might afford occasion to arouse the supposed latent Union sentiment in the Southern States. It might give time for sober reflection in the conditions of 1864 which were different from those of 1861. It might result in divisions among Southern leaders and Southern States. Mr. Davis favored an armistice but if it had been agreed on his Confederate presidency would have been imperiled. Probably the Confederate government would have dissolved. On the other hand, Mr. Lincoln was even at the point of a fierce earnestness opposed to any armistice—Grant’s hammering must not cease,