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in whom the President reposed implicit confidence, was sent as minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary to Paris to act in conjunction with Mr. Livingston. (Annals of Congress, 1802-1803, pp. 1095-1108.)

The instructions to Monroe and Livingston were full and were intended to cover every contingency that might arise. The ministers were to urge a cession of the Island of Orleans and of the Floridas. In case that France should refuse a cession, they were to gain all that was possible to secure the navigation of the Mississippi river. The free navigation of this river was the ultimatum. The desideratum was, to make the Mississippi the national boundary. Considerations were suggested which might influence the French government. If they should have formed any plan of seducing the Western people to separate from the Union, the fallacy should be pointed out. The commercial advantages of a cession should be shown, etc. It was indicated that &quot;to incorporate the inhabitants of the hereby ceded territory with the citizens of the United States on an equal footing, being a provision which cannot now be made,&quot; must be left for future action. &quot;The instability of the peace of Europe, the attitude taken by Great Britain, and the languishing state of the French finances, &quot; were mentioned, as rendering the present time favorable for negotiation.

These instructions show that Jefferson and Madison, while prudently refraining from any public expression of sanguine expectation, foresaw the coming struggle in Europe, and were founding hopes upon it. Yet there is no evidence that either of them dreamed that the full fruition of their hopes was so near at hand.

Meanwhile, the negotiations with Spain were speedily successful. In April the Spanish minister, Yrugo, announced the disavowal by Spain of the orders of her intendente in closing the port of New Orleans against American commerce. Thus one cause of irritation was