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Hilton Head, S.C., July 27, 1865.&emsp; Charleston, propounding to me three questions, as follows:
 * I have received your letter of the 17th instant, from

1st. Do you think that there are a number of bona fide loyal persons in this State large enough to warrant the early establishment of civil government?

2d. Do you think that the white population of South Carolina, if restored to the possession of political power in this State, would carry out the spirit of the emancipation proclamation, and go to work in a bona fide manner to organize free labor?

3d. What measures do you think necessary to insure such a result in this State?

The first of these questions I am forced to answer in the negative, provided that white persons only are referred to in the expression “bona fide loyal persons,” and provided that “the early establishment of civil government” means the early withdrawal of the general control of affairs from the United States authorities.

To the second question, I answer that I do not think that the white inhabitants of South Carolina, if left to themselves, are yet prepared to carry out the spirit of the emancipation proclamation; neither do I think that they would organize free labor upon any plan that would be of advantage to both whites and blacks until the mutual distrust and prejudice now existing between the races are in a measure removed.

To the third question I answer, that, in order to secure the carrying out of the “spirit of the emancipation proclamation,” and the organization of really free labor in good faith, it appears to me necessary that the military, or some other authority derived from the national government, should retain a supervisory control over the civil affairs in this State until the next season's crops are harvested and secured.

The reasons which have dictated my replies I shall notice quite briefly.

Loyalty in South Carolina—such loyalty as is secured by the taking of the amnesty oath and by the reception of Executive clemency—does not approach the standard of loyalty in the north. It is not the golden fruit of conviction, but the stern and unpromising result of necessity, arising from unsuccessful insurrection. The white population of the State accept the condition which has been imposed upon them, simply because there is no alternative.

They entered upon the war in the spring of 1861 and arrayed themselves on the side of treason with a unanimity of purpose and a malignity of feeling not equalled by that displayed in any other State.

The individual exceptions to this rule were too few in numbers and were possessed of too little power to be taken into account at all. Although the overt treason then inaugurated has been overcome by superior force, few will claim that it has been transformed into loyalty toward the national government. I am clearly of the opinion that it has not, and that time and experience will be necessary to effect such a change.

All intelligent whites admit that the “abolition of slavery” and the “impracticability of secession” are the plain and unmistakable verdicts of the war. Their convictions as yet go no further. Their preference for the “divine institution,” and their intellectual belief in the right of a State to secede, are as much articles of faith in their creed at the present moment as they were on the day when the ordinance of secession was unanimously adopted. When the rebel armies ceased to exist, and there was no longer any force that could be invoked for waging war against the nation, the insurgents accepted that fact simply as proof of the impossibility of their establishing an independent government. This sentiment was almost immediately followed by a general desire to save as much property as possible from the general wreck. To this state of the public mind, which succeeded the surrender of the rebel armies with noteworthy rapidity, I am forced to attribute the prevailing willingness