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LEFT TACTICS 227 TACTICS Cressy and Poitiers, but at Bannockburn was ridden down by the Scotch cavalry, because the flanking spearmen had been omitted. Gustavus Adolphus, by employ- ing cartridges, enabled his infantry to fire more quickly than his opponent and so to form on a wider front. The inven- tion of the bayonet, doing away with the necessity for pikemen to protect the mus- keteers, still further increased the fire- power of infantry. The British two-deep line overthrew, by its enveloping fire and charge, the column formation of the French in the Peninsula and of the Rus- sians at the Alma, though in this battle its defects ai'e shown in the confusion caused by moving to the attack over broken ground. In the battles of the Franco-German War of 1870-1871 it was found impossible to advance against the fire of modern breech-loading rifles ex- cept by rushes of comparatively thin lines of skirmishers, constantly re-en- forced by supports and reserves in rear. The magazine rifle and smokeless pow- der of to-day still further complicate the problem, presented to the assailant, of how to get to within 500 yards of the enemy without being destroyed. In warfare against savages large num- bers, fanatical courage, and rapid move- ments have to be met by special tactics. Thus the crescent-shaped enveloping at- tack of the Zulus and the rapid attacks of the Sudanese Arabs were received by the British in the impenetrable-square formation or by fonning "laagers"; op- posing a material obstacle to the on- slaught of an enemy unprovided with artillery. Thus, too, the Indians of the Western plains were met by a style of fighting resembling their own, and which the American troops also found service- able in encounters with the Filipinos. Cavalry tactics, apart from the excep- tional use of dismounted men, are much the same as in the time of the Byzan- tine empire. Cavalry fight by shock action only, and the power of man and horse has not altered. Artillery tactics consist in massing the fire of every gun as soon as possible on important points, and overwhelming the enemy's guns and infantry w^th projectiles at ranges of 2 miles or more, not shunning closer quar- ters if the necessity arises. Siege tactics belong to fortification, but follow the same general course as other combined tactics. Thus in defense the guns oblige early deployment and co-operate with the infantry in repelling the advance, while in the attack they destroy the material defenses and keep down the fire of the place so as to en- able the assault to be delivered. During the siege mining tactics will be made use of on both sides. The functions of the cavalry are first to try to drive off the enemy's cavalry and effect reconnois- sances on both sides; then on the at- tacker's side to complete the investment, and afterward secure the besieging troops against surprise. For instruction of tactics in the World War, see War, and related articles. TACTICS, NAVAL, the art of ma- noeuvring ships and fleets for the pur- pose of battle. Naval strategy, on the other hand, is the science of combining and employing fleets or single ships in order to carry out defined operations at sea or against an enemy's coast, for ob- taining command of the sea or certain portions of it. Though fleets had existed and battles at sea been fought from the earliest periods, it was not till toward the close of the 16th century, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, that naval war began to assume definite form. War at sea at this time does not appear to have been carried on by any definite plan, and consisted principally, if we except the attempt of the Great Armada, of raids on the enemy's commerce and coast towns. Perhaps the first organized at- tempt to obtain command of the sea as a distinct aim of the operations carried on are to be found in the three wars between the Dutch and English of 1652, 1665, and 1672. Both parties made desperate attempts to destroy the trade of the other, but in the second war Holland, considering the command of the sea the more important object, temporarily gave up her commerce, Dutch merchant ships being forbidden to put to sea. The net result of the three wars was to leave the honors pretty evenly divided between the two combatants. Several efforts were made by the French, between 1690 and their crushing defeat at Trafalgar, to ob- tain the command of the sea in order to effect the invasion of England. The first of these attempts, affording one of the best examples of the value of a thorough grasp of strategical principles, was foiled by the Earl of Torrington. An expe- rienced seaman and profound strategist, the earl was forced against his better judgment, by direct orders from the queen and council, to attack the vastly superior forces under Tourville, and ac- cordingly he gave battle (June 30, 1690) off^ Beachy Head. He was defeated, but skillfully drew off and fell back under the shelter of the Gunfleet Shoals at the mouth of the Thames. Here, though "beaten, inferior, and shut up behind sandbanks," yet from the strategic posi- tion it now held this fleet still remained such a "power in observation" as to paralyze the action of the victorious and superior force; and the French admiral.