Page:Cole v. State (214 Ark. 387).pdf/8

394 Having done so here, and having classified the offense here denounced as a felony, it cannot be said to be an arbitrary or an unreasonable one when considered in connection with the public good it seeks to protect. There is here no question of a labor dispute or of the right of peaceful picketing, but even picketing when accompanied by force, violence, intimidation or coercion cannot find any protection under the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Local Union 313 v. Stathakis, 135 Ark. 86, 205 S.W. 450, 6 A.L.R. 894; Riggs v. Tucker Duck & Rubber Co., 196 Ark. 571, 119 S.W.2d 507; Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 61 Sup. Ct. 552, 86 L. Ed. 836, 132 A.L.R. 1200. In the last mentioned case, it was said: 'Freedom of speech and freedom of the press cannot be too often invoked as basic to our scheme of society. But these liberties will not be advanced or even maintained by denying to the states with all their resources, including the instrumentality of their courts, the power to deal with coercion due to extensive violence.'

"There the Supreme Court reviewed and distinguished Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct.736, 84 L. Ed. 1093, and Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 746, 84 L. Ed. 1104, and said: 'Entanglement with violence was expressly out of those cases.' "We conclude, therefore, that said Act 193 is not open to constitutional objection."

Appellants say that the statute prevents free assembly. We disagree with that statement. The Act prevents unlawful assemblages which cause violence andinterfere with the rights of others. We hold: that § 2-B3 charges a definite and certain offense; that it is within the power of the State to enact such a law; and that no provision of the State or Federal Constitutions or Amendments is transgressed by § 2-B3 of the Act here under scrutiny.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence. The record in this case is the same record that was before us when we