Page:Cole v. State (210 Ark. 433).pdf/2

 had been prevented from working "by the use of force and violence," this being sufficient to charge a crime.
 * 1) STATUTES—CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PARTICULAR LAW.—Act 193 of 1943 is not void as contravening the State Constitution. See Smith and Brown v. State, 207 Ark. 106; Gurein [and others] v. State, The Law Reporter for April 15, 1946.
 * 2) CRIMINAL LAW—CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE.—Act 193 of 1943, § 1, makes it unlawful, "by the use of force or violence, or threat of the use of force or violence," to prevent any person from engaging in a lawful vocation. Held, tbat two separate and distinct offenses are stated.
 * 3) CRIMINAL LAW—ADMISSIBLE TESTIMONY.—Where an indictment authorized by Act 193 of 1943 charged only that a worker had, "by the use of force and violence," prevented a designated employe from engaging in a lawful occupation, it was error to allow witnesses to testify that "someone" among a group of strikers, while talking in a tent eight or ten hours earlier, had said that "they" were going to talk "to a boy who was working," and if he didn't talk right "they" would give him a whipping.

Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, First Division; Lawrence C. Auten, Judge; reversed.

Lindsey P. Walden, Elmer Schoggen, and Ross Robley, for appellants.

Guy E. Williams, Attorney General, and Earl N. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 

 GRIFFIN SMITH, Chief Justice. Disregarding other matters complained of by appellants, we agree that the judgments must be reversed because incompetent evidence was admitted.

Of 117 union laborers under contract with Southern Cotton Oil Company in Little Rock, 112 went out on strike December 17, 1945. The disgruntled former workers established picket lines and had a tent erected and maintained near the Company's property, but not on Company lands.