Page:Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski.pdf/6

Rh district court denies a party’s motion to compel arbitration, that party may take an interlocutory appeal. Section 16(a) creates a rare statutory exception to the usual rule that parties may not appeal before final judgment. See Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100, 108–109 (2009). Notably, Congress provided for immediate interlocutory appeals of orders denying—but not of orders granting—motions to compel arbitration.

The sole question before this Court is whether a district court must stay its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbitrability is ongoing. The answer is yes.

Section 16(a) does not say whether the district court proceedings must be stayed. But Congress enacted §16(a) against a clear background principle prescribed by this Court’s precedents: An appeal, including an interlocutory appeal, “divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U. S. 56, 58 (1982). That Griggs principle reflects a longstanding tenet of American procedure. See Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U. S. 150, 157 (1883); see also Price v. Dunn, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (, joined by and, concurring in denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 7) (describing Griggs principle as “well settled”); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U. S. 373, 379 (1985) (“In general, filing of a notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal”).

The Griggs principle resolves this case. Because the question on appeal is whether the case belongs in arbitration or instead in the district court, the entire case is essentially “involved in the appeal.” 459 U. S., at 58. As Judge Easterbrook cogently explained, when a party appeals the denial of a motion to compel arbitration, whether “the litigation may go forward in the district court