Page:Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors v. Bush.pdf/5

 organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons”). American forces were sent to Afghanistan and neighboring countries, and a United States-led alliance attacked the forces of the Taliban government and Al Qaeda.

The United States and its allies successfully removed the Taliban from power and captured, killed, or drove to flight some of the more notorious members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, was taken on November 13, 2001, and thousands of Taliban and Al Qaeda combatants were eventually captured or surrendered. Among these captives, the detainees deemed most dangerous by the United States military were transferred to the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

The detainees are being held at the naval base in a secure facility known as Camp X-Ray. They have been visited by members of the International Red Cross and diplomats from their home countries. Although the detainees have not been allowed to meet with lawyers, they have had some opportunity to write to friends and family members.

The district court had jurisdiction over the habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This court has jurisdiction to review the district court’s final order over the habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s dismissal of a habeas petition de novo. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir.2001); Edelbacher v. Calderon, 160 F.3d 582, 583 (9th Cir.1998).

This case stands or falls on whether the Coalition has standing to bring a habeas petition on behalf of the Guantanamo Bay detainees. Standing, as a general matter, raises both constitutional and prudential concerns incident to the exercise of jurisdiction. At its constitutional core, standing is a manifestation of the Article III case-or-controversy requirement; it is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to invoke the power of a federal court. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, “[i]n essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). The Coalition does not assert direct standing, but instead urges us to find next-friend standing under the federal habeas statute or standing under traditional principles of third-party standing. We address these arguments in turn.


 * A. Next-friend standing under 28 U.S.C. § 2242.

The federal habeas statute provides that the “[a]pplication for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (emphasis added). Congress added the words “or by someone acting in his behalf” by amendment in 1948. Even before the amendment, however, federal courts had long recognized that under appropriate circumstances, habeas petitions could be brought by third parties, such as family members or agents, on behalf of a prisoner. This species of third-party habeas standing, known as next-friend standing, was examined at length by the Supreme Court in Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 161–64, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990). In Whitmore, the Supreme Court recognized that next-friend standing “has long been an accepted basis for jurisdiction in certain circumstances.” The Court explained: