Page:Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors v. Bush.pdf/13

 . Here, we consider only the rights of the members of the Coalition to assert standing on behalf of the detainees and to seek habeas review of their detention. Because the Coalition failed to demonstrate any relationship with any of the detainees, it lacks next-friend or third-party standing to bring a habeas petition on their behalf. We therefore affirm the district court’s order as to the lack of standing.

We also vacate the district court’s determination that there was no jurisdiction in the Central District of California and its far-reaching ruling that there is no United States court that may entertain any of the habeas claims of any of the detainees. The district court was without jurisdiction to hold that the constitutionally embedded right of habeas corpus was suspended for all Guantanamo Bay detainees, without regard for their particular circumstances, whether they petitioned individually or through a true next friend on their behalf. The judgment of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part.

The court orders each side to bear its own costs. Judge Noonan, dissenting from this order, believes costs should be awarded in favor of the government. BERZON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I agree with the result reached in the court’s opinion. I write separately because I do not believe that we need to address whether next friend standing always requires a significant relationship. If we did need to address that question, I would be inclined to hold that a significant relationship is not always necessary.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163–64, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 185 (1990) adopted two requirements: (1) that the petitioner is unable to litigate his own cause; and (2) that the next friend be “truly dedicated” to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate. Although the Supreme Court noted that “it has been suggested that a ‘next friend’ must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest,” id. (emphasis added), the Court, notably, did not choose to adopt this suggestion, adhering instead to the two-pronged test. See also Sanchez-Velasco v. Dept. of Corrections, 287 F.3d 1015, 1026 (11th Cir.2002), ''cert. denied'' 525 U.S. 811, 119 S.Ct. 42, 142 L.Ed.2d 33 (1998) (“significant relationship” may not be an “independent requirement”); but see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 604 (4th Cir.2002) (“Hamdi I”) (concluding that a significant relationship is an “important requirement”).

This Court appeared to import the significant relationship requirement into Whitmore’s second prong in ''Massie ex rel. Kroll v. Woodford'', 244 F.3d 1192, 1194 (9th Cir.2001). Massie summarized Whitmore as follows: "In order to establish next friend standing, the putative next friend must show: (1) that the petitioner is unable to litigate his own cause due to mental incapacity, lack of access to court, or other similar disability; and (2) the next friend has some significant relationship with, and is truly dedicated to the best interests of, the petitioner. See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163–65, 110 S.Ct. 1717."

Massie’s summary of Whitmore was incorrect. As noted, the Supreme Court in Whitmore did not indicate that a “significant relationship” was part of the second Whitmore prong. Rather, only after stating the two-prong Whitmore test did the Court add “it has been suggested that a ‘next friend’ must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (emphasis added).