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110 inadequacy of the force for its attack, that Sir Hugh Rose was given the option of masking it and continuing his march to Kálpi. But rather than leave such an important stronghold in his rear, he determined to take it at all risks. This decision is a matter of some historical interest. Much as Sir Colin Campbell might desire to be relieved of 'the stiff neck' caused by having so constantly to look over his shoulder at Jhánsí, he began to doubt Sir Hugh Rose's ability to take the place with a comparatively small force; while he foresaw that a check before so strong a fortress would be little short of disastrous. The Commander-in-Chief had accordingly authorised Sir Hugh Rose to pass by Jhánsí if, after weighing all the circumstances of the case, he considered that the siege could not prudently be undertaken; and to march instead, in two divisions, one on Kálpi through Charkhári, and the other on Bánda. Lord Canning wrote on the same day to Sir Robert Hamilton, expressing a wish that, as Sir Hugh Rose was too weak in European infantry to run any risks, he 'should not consider himself under any obligation to attempt the reduction of Jhánsí against the possibility of success.'

But the General in command had no doubt on the subject, and resolved to carry out his original instructions at all risks, seeing how fatal it would be to leave a garrison of some 11,000 desperate men, under one of the most capable leaders of the Mutiny, to harass his