Page:Clayborn v. Bankers Standard Insurance Co.pdf/10

566   motion to dismiss, and, thus, our review is limited to the facts alleged in the pleadings. Because there was no allegation in the pleadings that Forrester-Davis is a charitable organization, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it determined that Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-210 is inapplicable to the facts of the present case.

[9, 10] However, we note that appellant's argument that Forrester-Davis is not subject to suit for tort because it is a charitable organization is meritless for another reason. We have never said that charitable organizations are altogether immune from suit. While we affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a case on the ground that the charitable organization was immune from liability in ''George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, Inc.'', 337 Ark. 206, 987 S.W.2d 710 (1999), no argument was raised in that case that a charitable organization is not subject to suit for tort, as was argued in the present case. We have repeatedly stated that the property of a charity cannot be sold under execution issued on a judgment rendered for the nonfeasance, misfeasance, or malfeasance of its agents or trustees. See, e.g., Fordyce & McKee v. Woman's Christian Nat'l Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550, 96 S.W. 155 (1906) (emphasis added). We have also recognized that the charitable-immunity doctrine as promulgated in Fordyce and its progeny has become a rule of property. ''See Williams v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n'', 246 Ark. 1231, 442 S.W.2d 243 (1969) (citing Helton v. Sisters of Mercy, 234 Ark. 76, 351 S.W.2d 129 (1961); Cabbiness v. City of North Little Rock, 228 Ark. 356, 307 S.W.2d 529 (1957); Fordyce, supra). In addition, we stated in Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953), "Judge Rose, [in Fordyce], commented on the statutory authority for suit, drawing a distinction between the right to sue and the power to execute in satisfaction of the judgment." Croswell, supra (citing Fordyce, supra). Our analysis indicates that a charitable organization may have suit brought against it and may have a judgment entered against it, but such judgment may not be executed against the property of the charity. We conclude that even if facts had been pled to allege that Forrester-Davis