Page:Civilization and barbarism (1868).djvu/222

178 Ayres commission, which had no other object than to prevent any adjustment, and his own pride and presumption on finding himself at the head of a more powerful and better disciplined army than the first, made him reject the peace proposals of the more modest General Paz. Facundo had this time arranged something like a plan for the campaign. Communications established in the Sierra de Cordova had excited the pastoral population to rebellion; General Villafañe approached on the north with the division from Catamarca, while Facundo came up from the south. It was not very difficult for General Paz to see through the designs of Quiroga, and to disappoint them. One night the army disappeared from the immediate neighborhood of Cordova, no one knew where; it had been seen by many persons, but in different places at the same time. If there has ever been in America anything like the complicated strategy of Bonaparte's campaigns in Italy, it was when Paz made forty companies cross the Sierra de Cordova and take a position where they would inevitably intercept all fugitives from a regular battle. The Montonera, paralyzed, surrounded on all sides, fell into the net which had been spread for it. It is not necessary to give the particulars of that memorable battle. General Paz, in his despatch, gave the number of his loss as seventy, for appearance sake, but in fact, he had only lost twelve men in a contest with eight thousand men, and twenty pieces of artillery. A simple maneuvre had defeated the valiant Quiroga; and the army which had cost so many tears and horrors of all kinds, only served to show Facundo's bad management, and to give to Paz several thousand useless prisoners.