Page:Civil code of Japan compared with French (1902-04-01).pdf/2

Rh tion of 1868 and the whole country was brought under the direct control of the central government. The four hereditary classes, namely, the Samurai, or soldiers, the agriculturists, the artisans, and the merchants were abolished. They all became equal in the eye of the law, and could freely choose their business or profession. The family system, which had been until then religiously preserved, was weakened, and in many instances the individual members of families were held directly responsible to the government. For criminal acts they were held personally liable, and so also for duties imposed by the conscription laws, while at the same time their capacity to hold property and to transact business independently of the head of the family was recognized. The improvements in maritime and land communication gave strong impetus to commercial enterprises and encouraged the formation of companies. Higher education, which had been almost the monopoly of the Samurai and the clergy, became the common right of all. A system of national education was adopted whereby all alike and without the least distinction could avail of the opportunities afforded. Courts of various grades were established to render equal justice to all. To meet exigencies created by these social and political changes, tentative and fragmentary legislation was resorted to. The fact that legislation of this kind could not keep pace with the wants of the rapidly progressing people is well illustrated by Edict No. 103 of the eighth year of Meiji, issued by the Daijokwan (Council of State) in the form of instructions to the judges, which had the effect of law until the Code came into operation. The instructions were that judges were to render justice according to law where there was an express enactment to be applied. When there was no such enactment they were to decide according to custom. In the absence of either law or custom, they were to decide according to just principles. What those just principles were, was left entirely to the discretion of the judges. It is curious to recall, in this connnectionconnection [sic], that when the introduction of foreign elements necessitated the creation of the office of Praetor Perigrinus in Rome, the office was established without any definition of the principles to be applied in the Praetorian Courts. The Praetors, therefore, were obliged to render judgments according to what they believed to be the principles of justice. In the course of time a system of jurisprudence was developed from their edicts and judgments. The Japanese judges, in seeking just principles to be applied to cases which were entirely novel, examined the jurisprudence of Europe and America, and, in