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6 "the advent of the Internet" enables "prompt disclosure of expenditures," which "provide[s]" political opponents "with the information needed" to intimidate and retaliate against their foes. Ante, at 55. Thus, "disclosure permits citizens . . . to react to the speech of [their political opponents] in a proper"—or undeniably improper—"way" long before a plaintiff could prevail on an as-applied challenge. Ibid.

I cannot endorse a view of the First Amendment that subjects citizens of this Nation to death threats, ruined careers, damaged or defaced property, or pre-emptive and threatening warning letters as the price for engaging in "core political speech, the 'primary object of First Amendment protection.'" McConnell, 540 U. S., at 264 (all small caps|THOMAS, J}}., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 410–411 (2000) (., dissenting)). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s judgment upholding BCRA §§201 and 311.