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Rh cite no authority that established “potentially valuable economic information” as a traditionally recognized property interest. See Wallach, 935 F. 2d, at 462–463. And, the Second Circuit has not since attempted to ground the right-to-control theory in traditional property notions. We have consistently rejected such federal fraud theories that “stray from traditional concepts of property.” Cleveland, 531 U. S., at 24. For its part, the Government—despite relying upon the right-to-control theory for decades, including in this very case—now concedes that if “the right to make informed decisions about the disposition of one’s assets, without more, were treated as the sort of ‘property’ giving rise to wire fraud, it would risk expanding the federal fraud statutes beyond property fraud as defined at common law and as Congress would have understood it.” Brief for United States 25–26. Thus, even the Government now agrees that the Second Circuit’s right-to-control theory is unmoored from the federal fraud statutes’ text.