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 and for ever—perhaps a very good thing, at least for some parties, but hardly commanded by the Mosaic law. Furthermore, when in Leviticus xxi. 14, a High Priest is forbidden to marry a widow, common sense infers that other priests and other men may marry a widow; but according to this writer no priest nor any other man can lawfully marry a widow; yet this inference from the prohibition of the High Priest is the only authority or permission in the law of Moses for the lawfulneslawfulness [sic] of a priest or any other man to marry a widow. If this writer be consistent or sincere in his reasoning, he certainly should not marry a widow. But to be serious, and not multiply examples, we may remark, that even in the New Testament the lawfulness of a man's marrying a second time has the authority of inference, and that alone, from the permission given, to a widow (Romans vii.) to take a second husband; and by inference our proved the doctrine of the Resurrection, and St. Paul the doctrine of Justification by Faith.

But to the principle of the argument itself. No principle is more generally understood and acted upon in both civil and criminal jurisprudence than this—that "when a prohibition is given with a limitation, that where the limitation ceases, the prohibition ceases, especially when the limitatonlimitation [sic] is with regard to time." The examples above given are illustrations of the truth of this principle; and thus when we are prohibited from stealing and bearing false witness against our neighbour, it is implied that we should be honest and truthful: when we are prohibited from doing any labour on the Sabbath day, it is implied that we may work on others days; when a criminal is prohibited his liberty and sent to prison for twelve months, it is implied that at the expiration of that time he shall be restored to his liberty; when a minor is incapacitated or prohibited from selling or holding property, it is implied that on his becoming of age he can do both; the