Page:Cicero And The Fall Of The Roman Republic.djvu/464

412 The essential mischief, the predominance of the professional soldiers in the commonwealth, was not touched. It was of no avail that Italy declared herself with enthusiasm for the cause of the Republic and sent her sons by tens of thousands to fight for freedom. It was now too late to prepare for danger. A nation which will be free, must not trust its defence solely in the hands of a professional soldiery; in spite of the irksomeness and the comparative inefficiency of a short-service system, it must at all risks train the mass of the citizens to the use of arms. This necessity was even more urgent in the ancient than in the modern world, for the use of the rifle can be taught far more rapidly than the use of the shield, the sword, and the javelin; a few highly practised soldiers could in those days put to the rout whole regiments of half-trained men. In all the civil wars of Rome there is only one instance in which short-service men won a battle from veterans. The exception is the engagement in the lines of Dyrrachium in 48 B.C. (see p. 339), and in that case the credit rests rather with the commander than with the troops. The victory was due to the consummate skill with which Pompey took advantage of Cæsar's rashness in attempting to cover an extent of ground too great for his forces.