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49 B.C.]

looked for an opportunity of flight. His daughter indeed urged him to await the issue of the Spanish campaign, which was now commencing; but this idea he entirely discarded, holding that it would be even more his duty to shake himself loose from Cæsar, if he were victorious than if he were beaten. There were difficulties in the way of escape. Antony, who was left in command in Italy, informed Cicero that he could let no one go without Cæsar's permission. He pretended acquiescence, and took precautions to elude the vigilance of Antony's spies, even dropping during the last fortnight his correspondence with Atticus for fear that the letters might fall into wrong hands. Meanwhile he secretly prepared a vessel at Caieta, as soon "as the first swallow appeared," and from thence he set sail on the 3d of June (really 19th of April) for Pompey's headquarters.

The year 48 B.C. saw the conflict between the two great commanders in person. The strategy was admirable on both sides, full of daring and genius on the part of Caesar, and of skill and prudence on the part of Pompey. The campaign in Epirus after many vicissitudes ended favourably for Pompey, who beat Cæsar out of the lines in which he had attempted to enclose him at Dyrrachium. Cæsar was as great in defeat as in victory; he succeeded in extricating his army from the pursuit, and marched right across the peninsula, thereby transferring the war to fresh ground on the eastern coasts of Greece. Pompey, who had command of the great northern road passed