Page:Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje - The Achehnese - tr. Arthur Warren Swete O'Sullivan (1906).djvu/388

 declaration before the judge, who must of course enquire into the case in the first instance.

The judge before whom the declaration is made gives no verdict (for which indeed there is no necessity) but declares the facts viz. whether or no the divorce is brought into force by means of the declaration made in his presence coupled with the fulfilment of the other condition as evidenced by the woman's statement.

As appears from the above explanation, this adat in favour of the woman is a most reasonable one since if the law were applied in its purity, the right of demanding separation (faskh) on the grounds mentioned would be entirely denied to the woman. Thus where Van den Berg, in the essay referred to (pp. 486–7) notices as "peculiar" the wide use made of the taʾlīq, and characterizes it as "a somewhat useless expedient for dissolving marriages", we are constrained to qualify as most peculiar the writer's want of familiarity both with the essential nature of this native adat and with the rules of Mohammedan law as to taʾlīq and faskh. This adat is universally esteemed by native teachers and laymen as a social blessing, in view of the thoughtlessness with which marriages are entered into, the indifference of many husbands to their wives and their proneness to abandon them, as well as the large numbers of those who lead a roving life.